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An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law 
Robert H. Sitkoff † 
 
Abstract 
 This paper develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts, 
focusing chiefly on donative trusts.  The agency costs approach offers fresh 
insights into recurring problem areas in trust law including, among others, 
trust modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, 
trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of 
so-called trust “protectors,” and spendthrift trusts.  The normative claim is 
that the law of trusts should minimize the agency costs inherent to locating 
managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the benefi-
ciaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante in-
structions of the settlor.  Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a 
temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the 
settlor’s original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem when risk-
bearing and management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will 
act in the best interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants).  The positive 
claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines, the law of trusts 
conforms to the suggested normative approach.  The paper draws on the ec o-
nomics of the principal-agent problem and the theory of the firm and it en-
gages the ongoing debate about whether trust law is closer to property law or 
contract law.  The analysis should be amenable to extension in future work to 
commercial and charitable trusts.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the modern literature of corpo-
rate law and economics.1  Meanwhile the private express trust, an entity to 
which the corporation traces its roots,2 has been left largely untouched by sys-
tematic agency costs analysis.3  Yet in an echo of the famous Berle and Means 
critique of the corporation’s “separation of ownership and control,” the center-
piece feature of the private trust as an organizing device for the professional 
management of assets is that it “separates the benefits of ownership from the 
burdens of ownership.”4  This implies that many of the tools drawn from the 
agency cost theories of the firm that are routinely applied in the economic 
analysis of corporate law should be similarly applicable to the remarkably un-
derdeveloped economic analysis of trust law.5  Indeed, problems of shirking and 
difficulties in monitoring, which is the stuff that drives agency costs analysis, 
abounds in trust administration.  Accordingly, this paper develops an agency 
costs theory of trust law as organizational law, for now focusing on the donative 
private trust.  The analysis should be amenable to extension in future work to 
commercial and charitable trusts.6 
Consider a stylized example.  In the prototypical gratuitous trust, the 
settlor (“S”) in effect contracts with the trustee (“T”) to manage a portfolio of as-
sets in the best interests of the beneficiaries (“B1” and “B2,” collectively the 
                                                 
1 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976), reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, Founda-
tions of Organizational Strategy 51, 56-67 & 367 n. 12; Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 778 (1972).  The classic exposi-
tion in the legal literature is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law  (1991).  See also Symposium: Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law , 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1395-1774 (1989); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. 
& Econ. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. 
L. & Econ. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 
288 (1980).  See generally Stephen Bainbridge, Corporate Law and Economics 26-38 (2002). 
2 See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoc-
trinal Legal Transplants , 96 Nw. L. Rev. 651, 655-57 (2002); Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Founda-
tion of Corporate Law , 27 J. Corp. L. 333, 333-35 (2002).  See also Frederic Maitland, Trust and Corpo-
ration, in III H. A. L. Fisher, The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland 321, 395 (1911). 
3 Prior systemic applications of agency costs analysis to trust law are scarce.  Notable exceptions include 
A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. Toronto L. J. 186 (1986); Jonathan Macey, Private 
Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 Emory L. J. 295, 315-21 (1988).  This is not to say, how-
ever, that agency costs analysis has not informed occasional specific analyses.  See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch 
& William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L. J. 1, 28-29 (1992); Adam J. 
Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 913, 928 (1999). 
4 Compare Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), 
with Austin W. Scott, I Scott on Trusts  § 1, p. 2 (4th ed. 1987) [hereafter “Scott on Trusts”].  
5 See Ogus, supra note __, at 186 (1986) (noting the “neglect” of the trust by the law-and-economics 
movement); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis , 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434, 435 (1998) (same). 
6 On extensions to charitable trusts, see infra  notes 179, 233, 293 and text accompanying.  On exten-
sions to commercial trusts, see infra notes 12-13, 145, 289-292 and text accompanying. 
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“Bs”), subject to the ex ante restraints imposed by the settlor.7  Hence, using the 
vocabulary of agency in economic rather than legal parlance, T can be viewed as 
the agent of S; but T can also be viewed as the agent of B1 and B2.  To the ex-
tent that T might slight or ignore what S would have wanted in the ongoing 
management of the trust, we have a problem of agency costs in the S/T relation-
ship.  But to the extent that T might slight or ignore what B1 and B2 want in 
the ongoing management of the trust, we have the usual agency problem when 
risk-bearing (here by B1 and B2) is separated from management (here by T).  So 
where the corporate form presents one dominant source of agency costs (the 
shareholder/manager relationship), the trust presents two.  This difference is 
crucial, because it means that even if the vocabulary for the economic analysis of 
trust law will be similar to that of the economic analysis of corporate law, the 
underlying analyses will be different.  Given the trust’s independent donative 
transfer, commercial transaction, and capital markets significance,8 this should 
not be surprising. 
That S saddled his or her transfer to B1 and B2 with the friction of com-
peting principal-agent relationships is the core insight that animates the agency 
costs analysis.  The paper’s normative claim is that the law of private trusts 
should minimize the agency costs inherent to locating managerial authority 
with the trustee (T) and the residual claim with the beneficiaries (B1 and B2), 
but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of 
the settlor (S).  This qualification gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiar-
ies as the trustee’s primary principal.9  The positive claim is that, at least with 
respect to traditional doctrines,10 the law conforms to the suggested normative 
approach.11   
                                                 
7 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L. J. 625 (1995).  See 
also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Cen-
tury’s End, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1881, 1881 (2000). 
8 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States.  A Basic Study of Its Spe-
cial Contribution, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 133, 133 (1998); sources cited in infra note 13. 
9 In a sense, this paper is a (long) answer to the question posed in William T. Allen & Reiner Kraakman, 
Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organizations § 2.3.3, p. 38 (2003), “If the trustee re-
lationship is analogized to the agency relationship, whom should we view as the principal?”  See also id. 
at 36.  Note, however, that under traditional doctrine the settlor, even if living, cannot enforce the terms 
of the trust (see infra Part IV.B.3)—hence the length of the answer. 
10  Analysis of modern reforms such as asset protection trusts, see Stewart Sterk, Asset Protection 
Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1035 (2000) [hereafter Sterk, APT], and the 
abrogation of the rule against perpetuities, see Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,  
116 Harv. L. Rev 2588; Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2097 (2003) [hereafter Sterk, RAP]; Joel C. Dobris 
The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends: An Essay, 35 Real Prop. Prob. 
& Tr. J. 601 (2000); Angela M. Vallario, Death By A Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 
J. Legis. 141 (1999), requires not only agency costs analysis but also reference to their political 
economies and the dynamics of the domestic and international regulatory competition in private trust 
law.  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Jonathan Corsico, Follow the Money: The Domestic and Offshore 
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Business (work-in-progress on file with the author).   
11 This paper is therefore in some tension with Macey, supra note __, though this tension is more appar-
ent than real.  For a variety of institutional reasons that are lucidly canvassed in Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
5
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Theoretical and practical payoffs to the agency costs approach abound.  
On the theoretical side, it points to a further research agenda for the economic 
analysis of trust law.  Beneficiaries assume the role of risk-bearing “residual 
claimants” (or at least they do in the context of donative trusts),12 and important 
questions for research include the following:  When and why do ind ividuals 
choose to organize their relationships—both commercial and donative—by refer-
ence to the law of trusts rather than some other branch of organizational law?13  
What is the private trust’s default governance arrangement, and why?  Does the 
law do a good job of supplying the terms that the relevant parties would have 
bargained for with full information and low negotiation costs and, for that mat-
ter, who are the relevant parties?  What is the role of markets—including labor, 
product, and capital markets14—in all this?  Because trust law is chiefly state 
law, is there a regulatory competition among them, and if so, to what end?15   
On the practical side, agency costs analysis offers fresh insights into re-
curring problem areas in the law of private trusts including, among others, trust 
modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-
investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-
called trust “protectors,” and spendthrift trusts.  Moreover, on several of these 
and other issues American and English trust law diverge, so a further payoff of 
the agency costs approach is that it provides a framework for evaluating the 
competing Anglo-American views.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Part I situates the analysis within the 
current literature of trust law.  More specifically, it advances the claim that 
classifying trust law as organizational law and subjecting it to agency costs 
analysis is the logical next step in the nascent economic analysis of the private 
express trust.  Thus, this paper does not advance the inherently dubious claim 
that all prior approaches to the trust should be discarded.  To the contrary, the 
insights developed within the debate about whether trust law is closer to con-
                                                                                                                                          
The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule , 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev 52 (1987), the evolu-
tion towards efficiency in trust law reflects a blend of common law and statutory reform.  For further 
discussion, see Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note __. 
12 See infra Parts III.D., IV.A.  The parenthetical qualification is necessary because in contrast to the 
typical settlor of a gratuitous trust, “the settlor in a commercial trust almost always retains a residual 
interest.”  Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 
58 Bus. Law. 559, 562 (2003).  
13 See generally Schwarcz, supra note __, at 560, 573-84; Hansmann & Mattei, supra  note __, at 473-78; 
John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:  The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L. 
J. 165, 189 (1997).  See also Michael Bryan, Reflections on Some Commercial Applications of the Trust, 
in Ian Ramsay, ed., Key Developments in Corporate Law and Trusts Law  205-26 (2002).  See also Ste-
ven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations, __ Duke J. Comp. & Int. L. __ (forth-
coming 2003).  In particular the trust plays a critical role as a special purpose entity in structured fi-
nance transactions.  See, e.g., Schwarcz, at 564-65; Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Se-
curitization and Asymmetric Information (manuscript). 
14 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. __ 
(forthcoming 2003). 
15 See Sterk, APT, supra note __; Sterk, RAP, supra note __; Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note __. 
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tract law or property law point to the viability of the agency costs approach.16  In 
Part II, the paper briefly reviews the agency cost theories of the firm and the 
economics of the principal-agent problem.  Both underpin the paper’s agency 
costs approach to trust law.  Part III identifies and then illuminates through 
agency costs analysis the key relationships between the parties who have an in-
terest in the trust property and/or its management.  Finally, Part IV develops 
the paper’s positive and normative claims with reference to illustrative trust law 
doctrines including, but not limited to, the recurring issues mentioned in the 
prior paragraph.  In so doing, Part IV helps to illuminate some of the endoge-
nous governance considerations relevant to the initial choice to make use of 
trust law rather than some other branch of organizational law.17 
I. TRUST LAW AS ORGANIZATIONAL LAW  
This Part advances the claim that the law of trusts blends property law-
like and contract law-like features.  Hence trust law is properly classified and 
best understood as organizational law.  This Part may therefore be situated 
within the discourse over whether trust law is more closely related to contract 
law or property law.  Early participants in this debate, which has been ongoing 
for over 100 years, include Frederic Maitland (who took a contractarian perspec-
tive), Austin Scott (who took a proprietary perspective), and Harlan Fiske Stone 
(another contractarian).18  More recently, the discussion has been reenergized 
and infused with greater economic sophistication by John Langbein and by 
Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei.19   
                                                 
16 The ensuing agency costs analysis owes some of its stimulation to a pair of recent articles, the first by 
John Langbein and the second by Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei.  See Langbein, supra note __; 
Hansmann & Mattei, supra  note __.  See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential 
Role of Organizational Law , 110 Yale L. J. 387, 416 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 843-49 (2001); Ogus, supra note __.  Its more gen-
eral inspiration is the nexus of contracts models of the firm.  See sources cited in supra note 1; infra  
Part II. 
17 The paper puts the exogenous tax features of the private trust to the side (they are exogenous in that 
they stem from the tax code rather than trust law).  For discussion, see Edward Halbach, The Uses and 
Purposes of Trusts in the United States, in David Hayton, ed., Modern International Develo pments in 
Trust Law  123-43, at 139-42 (1999).  Thus, the ensuing analysis for the most part will not address ex-
ogenous variables that are admittedly relevant to the choice between organizational forms such as their 
differing tax and bankruptcy treatments.  For discussion with respect to commercial trusts, see Lang-
bein, supra note __, at 180-81; Schwarcz, supra note __, at 581. 
18 On the Maitland/Scott “dialogue,” see Langbein, supra  note __, at 644-46 (collecting and describing 
their publications).  See also Harlan F. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 
Colum. L. Rev. 467 (1917). 
19 For modern American manifestations, see Langbein, supra note __; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 
__; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __; Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 844 & n. 248; Joel C. 
Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to 
Think of England Anymore, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 543, 546-48 (1998); Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand 
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1196-97 & n. 13 (1985).  See 
also Philbrick, supra note __, at 151; Richard Powell, Powell on Real Property ¶ 513[3], at pp. 41-142 
(1995).  For modern English manifestations, see David Hayton, Developing the Obligation Characteris-
tic of the Trust, 117 L. Q. Rev. 96, 107-08 (2001); Paul Matthews, From Obligation to Property, and 
Back Again? The Future of the Non-Charitable Purpose Trust, in Hayton, supra note __, at 203-41; 
George Gretton, Trusts Without Equity, 49 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 599, 603-08 (2000); Joshua Getzler, Leg-
7
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A. Trust Law as Property Law 
In accord with the  views of Scott,20 the law of trusts is most frequently 
classified as a species of property law.  The 1959 Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, for example, characterizes the “creation of a trust . . . as a conveyance of 
the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a contract.”21  Like-
wise Gregory Alexander recently distinguished the trustee’s fiduciary obligation 
from those of corporate and other fiduciaries on the ground that the fiduciary 
relationship in trust law is “property-based.”22  In England, moreover, a leading 
treatise suggests that the law of trusts “is at the heart of the common law of 
property,”23 and the just-finalized (2003) first two volumes of the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts retain the view of the Second Restatement that the stake of the 
beneficiaries is in the nature of a property interest.24   
For developing a functional understanding of trust law, however, merely 
classifying it as property law, without a functional analysis of the trust’s pro-
prietary or in rem features, is unsatisfying.25  To be sure, the existence of spe-
cifically identified property (the trust res) is necessary for trust formation.26  But 
                                                                                                                                          
islative incursions into modern trusts doctrine in England: The Trustee Act 2000 and the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 2 Glob. Jur. Top. Art. 2 (2002); Joshua Getzler, Patterns of Fusion 
164-65, in Peter Birks, ed., The Classification of Obligations 157-92 (1997); Neil Jones, Trusts in Eng-
land after the Statute of Uses 192-96, in Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Intinera 
Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective 173 (1998); Michael Macnair, The Conceptual 
Basis of Trusts in the Later 17th and Early 18th Centuries 221-29, in id. at 207; Richard Edwards, 
Trusts and Equity 16-29 (5th ed. 2002); Graham Moffat, Trusts Law—Texts and Materials 190-95 (3d 
ed 1999); Richard Nolan, Property in a Fund (manuscript).  See also Patrick Parkinson, Reconceptualis-
ing the Express Trust, 61 Camb. L. J. 657 (2002); Stefan Grundmann, The Evolution of Trust and Treu-
hand in the 20th Century  471-78, in Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra, at 470; C.E.F. Rickett, The Clas-
sification of Trusts, 18 N. Z. U. L. Rev. 305 (1999); Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts 
as a Legal Category, 5 L. & Hist. Rev. 303, 322-50 (1987); Joel C. Dobris, Stewart E. Sterk, & Melanie 
B. Leslie, Estates and Trusts 476-77 (2d ed. 2003); Elias Clark, et. al., Gratuitous Transfers:  Wills, In-
testate Succession, Trusts, Gifts, Future Interests, and Estate and Gift Taxation 454-56 (4th ed. 1999). 
20 See Langbein, supra note __, at 643-46.  See also Eugene F. Scoles, Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Ronald C. 
Link, & Patricia Gilchrist Roberts, Problems and Materials on Decedents’ Estates and Trusts 605-06 
(6th ed. 2000); Parkinson, supra note __, at 657-58. 
21 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 197 cmt. b (emphasis added).  See Langbein, supra note __, at 648-
49.   
22 Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships , 85 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 768 & n. 
7 (2000). See also Getzler, supra note __, at 10-14 (similar analysis by an English trust scholar).  But 
see Sitkoff, supra note __ (comparing the fiduciary obligation in corporate and trust law).  
23 Robert Pearce & John Stevens, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations v (3d ed. 2002). 
24 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 5(i) & cmt. i.  
25 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 435-38 (“While there is an extensive legal literature on the 
institution of the trust, that literature—whether domestic or comparative in focus—tends to be doc-
trinal rather than broadly functional in perspective.”).  See also Langbein, supra note __, at 643-66; 
Sarah Worthington, The Commercial Utility of the Trust Vehicle , in David Hayton, ed., Extending the 
Boundaries of Trusts and Sim ilar Ring-Fenced Funds 135 (2002). 
26 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 74; II Scott on Trusts § 74, pp. 428-32.  See also Jane B. Baron, The 
Trust Res and Donative Intent, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 45 (1986).  This is an important difference between the 
trust and, say, a life insurance contract.  The insurance company, unlike a trustee, is not required to 
segregate any assets.  See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 
332 n. 2 (6th ed. 2000). 
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continuing to deem trust law to be a species of property law for that reason,27 or 
to do so because of the private trust’s origin in the conveyance of land, obscures 
not only the trust’s proprietary functions, but also trust law’s highly enabling, 
elastic, flexible, and default nature with respect to its in personam relations.  As 
Scott’s famous treatise observes, “The duties of the  trustee are such as the crea-
tor of the trust may choose to impose; the interests of the beneficiaries are such 
as he may choose to confer upon them.”28   
Accordingly, the task for the functional study of trust law should be to 
identify its in rem proprietary elements and then to understand how they have 
been blended over time with the trust’s in personam contractarian elements.  
For as Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have recently observed, the modern 
law of trusts offers many of the in rem benefits of property law while at the 
same time offers much of the in personam flexibility of contract law.29 
B. The Contractarian Challenge 
In an important recent article, John Langbein offered a functional ac-
count of the law of trusts that challenged the received wisdom of trust law as 
property law by contending that trust law’s contractarian elements predomi-
nate.  To Langbein, “the deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indis-
tinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary contract.  Trusts are con-
tracts.”30  In comparison to the meaning of “contractarian” as that term is used 
in the literature of corporate law and economics, however, Langbein’s contrac-
tarian approach is more closely allied with the law of contracts than with the 
“nexus of contracts” metaphor that informs the agency cost theories of the 
firm.31  On this view, the basis for the rights and remedies of the beneficiary as 
against the trustee, which is to say the law of trust governance, might be reck-
oned for expositional purposes as a third-party beneficiary contract between the 
settlor and trustee.32   
                                                 
27 See II Scott on Trusts § 74, pp. 429-30; Parkinson, supra  note __, at 658-59, 663-67; Rickett, supra  
note __, at 308-09.  See also Baron, supra note __, at 51-54.  Cf. Langbein, supra note __, at 627. 
28 I Scott on Trusts § 1, p. 2.  See also Halbach, supra note __, at 133. 
29 See Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 843-49.  See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Property, Contract, and Verification:  The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 
J. Legal Stud. S373, S375 (2002).   Cf. Hayton, supra note __, at 107-08; Francis S. Philbrick, Property  
10, 150-60 (1939). 
30 Langbein, supra note __, at 627.  See also Parkinson, supra note __, at 659, 676-82 (suggesting “that 
the law of trusts is better conceptualised as a species of obligation rather than being understood as a 
form of property ownership”). 
31 Compare Langbein, supra note __, at 627, with Bainbridge, supra note __, at 27-28 (“As used by con-
tractarians, however, the term is not limited to those relationships that constitute legal contracts.”); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Na-
ture of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819, 822-23 (1999).  See also infra Part II.C; sources cited in supra  note 
1. 
32 See Langbein, supra note __, at 650. One might think of the rights and duties imposed by the trust 
instrument as stemming not from the law of trusts but rather from the law of the trust.  Cf. E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.1, pp. 425-26 (3d ed. 1999). 
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Langbein’s analysis implies that trust law’s role is to offer a set of stan-
dardized terms that minimize transaction costs for the deal between the settlor 
and the trustee.  By invoking the law of trusts, the settlor and the trustee need 
only record the extent to which their deal deviates from the default governance 
regime.33  This view has two important normative implications.  First, trust 
law’s default governance regime, including most critically the fiduciary obliga-
tion of the trustee to the beneficiaries,34 should reflect the terms for which the 
parties would likely have bargained with low negotiation costs and full informa-
tion.  Second, courts should employ an intention-seeking approach on questions 
of interpretation.35  Thus, with respect to matters of internal trust governance, 
Langbein demonstrates both the positive and the normative power of the sort of 
hypothetical bargain analysis that is familiar from contract and corporate law 
and economics.36   
For purposes of understanding the relevance of trust law to the dealings 
of the trusts’ principal parties with outsiders, however, the model of the trust as 
functionally equivalent to a third-party beneficiary contract runs into trouble.  
The problem is that in the usual third-party beneficiary contract, the rights of 
the parties and third-party beneficiaries to the contract do not implicate the 
rights of other nonparties to the deal.  But regulating the relationships with 
outsiders of the trust’s insiders (the trustee, the beneficiaries, and the settlor) is  
a key feature of trust law, one that implicates something of an in rem dynamic.37  
This includes the law of trustee insolvency (an exceedingly rare phenomenon in 
donative trusts but an important consideration for commercial trusts);38 spend-
thrift trusts (the more common problem of beneficiary insolvency);39 equitable 
tracing principles;40 and the continuity of the office of the trustee despite turn-
                                                 
33 See Langbein, supra  note __, at 660-63.  See also Ogus, supra note __, at 206-07. 
34 See infra Part IV.D. 
35 See infra note 106 and text accompanying. 
36 Langbein, supra note __, at 630, 663-64.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in In-
complete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87, 89-91 (1989) (collecting il-
lustrative examples).   
37 This is the important contribution of Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __.  See also Hansmann & Kra-
akman, supra note __; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __.  For discussion and references see infra Part 
I.C. 
38 Langbein himself called the law of trustee insolvency “the weak point of contractarian analysis.”  
Langbein, supra  note __, at 667-69.  See also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 454-61, 469-72; 
Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 846-47; Getzler, supra note __, at 12-13.  On the relevance of inso l-
vency to commercial trusts, see Schwarcz, supra note __, at 581. 
39 See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 149-62; infra Part IV.B.2.  Although the law of con-
tracts sometimes allows the promisee (the role played by the settlor in Langbein’s model) to disable the 
third-party beneficiary from assigning his or her chose in action to another, see Farnsworth, supra  note 
__, at § 11.4, pp. 717-18, it does not allow for the promisee to disable the third-party beneficiary from 
alienating that chose in action to both voluntary and involuntary creditors.  See Hansmann & Mattei, 
supra note __, at 452-53 & n. 58.  Cf. David M. English, Is There A Uniform Trust Act in Your Future, 
Prob. & Prop. 25, 30 (January/February 2000).   
40 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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over in its occupant.41  Explanation of these features requires acknowledgement 
of trust law’s proprietary features.  Thus, as Langbein concluded, “Trust is a hy-
brid of contract and property, and acknowledging contractarian elements does 
not require disregarding property components whose convenience abides.”42   
C. Asset Partitioning and Organizational Law 
In a subsequent article that revisited the functional relevance of trust 
law’s proprietary features, Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei argued “that it is 
precisely the property-like aspects of the trust that are the principal contribu-
tion of trust law.”43  This is not to say that they have taken up the mantle of 
Austin Scott.  To the contrary, they “agree with Langbein that, so far as the rela-
tionships between the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary are concerned, 
trust law adds very little to contract law.”44  Rather, they argued that the impor-
tant contribution of trust law is its ability “to facilitate an accompanying organi-
zation of rights and responsibilities between the three principal parties [i.e., the 
settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary] and third parties, such as creditors, 
with whom the principal parties deal.”45  By this Hansmann and Mattei refer in 
particular to “the use of trust law to shield trust assets from claims of the trus-
tee’s personal creditors.”46   
So Hansmann and Mattei’s contribution—which might be understood as 
a specific application of a later, more general project by Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman47—was to stress the importance of trust law’s extraordinary “asset 
partitioning” function.  That is, the law of trusts allows the trustee to deal sepa-
rately with creditors of the trust property from creditors of his or her own per-
sonal property.  With respect to all creditors, the law of trusts in effect (though 
                                                 
41 See infra Part III.B.  In fairness, however, many contracts provide for assumption or assignment to 
deal with the turnover problem.  See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note __, at ch. 11. 
42 Langbein, supra note __, at 669. 
43 Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 469. 
44 Id. at 470.   
45 Id. at 472, 451-64. The text above should not be read, however, as an embrace of their overstatement 
that “organizational law is much more important as property law than as contract law,” Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra  note __, at 390, or that “[ p]rivately prepared standard form contracts” could match 
the drafting efficiencies of the present system of public provision of default rules for trust governance.  
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 448-49.  True, in the absence of trust law the parties could incor-
porate the language of the Restatement’s fiduciary provisions into their deal.  See Hansmann & Mattei, 
supra note __, at 448.  But the viability of that approach depends on the existence of ample judicial exe-
gesis of the Restatement’s text.  Precedent is a public good, and the terms of a privately prepared con-
tract can be duplicated by anyone.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 35.  See also Marcel 
Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Eco-
nomics of Boilerplate”) , 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and 
Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995). 
46 Id. at 438, 451-64. 
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not formally, at least not yet48) splits the  trustee into “two distinct legal persons: 
a natural person contracting on behalf of himself, and an artificial person acting 
on behalf of the beneficiaries.”49  This creation of “two distinct legal persons” 
could not feasibly be reproduced with explicit contracting.50  Thus asset parti-
tioning represents an important difference between organizational forms and 
simple contractual arrangements.51  The former have an external proprietary or 
in rem dimension that complements their internal contractarian or in personam 
features. 
By giving a functional explanation for and a specific identification of the 
essential proprietary dimension of trust law, the Hansmann and Mattei project 
may be harmonized with Lanbein’s contractarian approach.  Taken together, 
they show that the law of trusts, like the law of other organizations, offers a nice 
blending of in rem and in personam features.  And this implies that, going for-
ward, the study of the law of private trusts should more closely resemble the 
study of other organizational forms,52 an endeavor in which agency costs analy-
sis abounds. 
D. The Rise of the Managerial Trust 
Further support for treating the law of trusts as organizational law 
stems from the empirical observation that the use of the private trust in modern 
practice has come increasingly to resemble the use of other organizational 
forms.  As Langbein and others have shown, owing to the liberalization of tes-
tamentary freedom, the lifting of feudal restrictions on land transfer, and the 
shift in modern wealth away from land,53 the private trust has evolved from a 
vehicle for conveying and preserving ancestral land into an organizing device 
that allows owners of property to ensure the ongoing and intergenerational pro-
fessional management of their wealth.54  In other words, in addition to classic 
but still relevant context-specific rationales such as minimizing taxes and asset 
                                                 
48 See Halbach, supra note __, at 1882-83 (“Without abandoning the basic definition of a trust as a fidu-
ciary relationship, there appear to be subtle but practically significant departures from the concept that 
a trust is not an entity.”); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt.  a & Reporter’s Notes thereto.  See also 
Tatarian v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 672 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. App. 1996) (analogizing the 
trust to a corporation and treating the trust as a separate entity).  Cf. Schwarcz, supra note __, at 574-
75. 
49 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at 416.   
50 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 466. 
51 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __. 
52 For a specific application of this general point, see Richard W. Painter, Contracting Around Conflicts 
in a Family Representation:  Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 353, 
367-69 (2001). 
53 See Moffat, supra note __, at 37 (“The significance for trusts law of this shift in the nature of family 
wealth-holdings—that is, from land (predominantly) to investment assets as well as land—can scarcely 
be overstated.”).  See also John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth 
Transmission, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 722 (1988). 
54 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note __, at 632-43; Moffat, supra note __, at 24-33.  Cf. Halbach, supra note 
__, at 133-36.  
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protection, the donative trust today is also used more generally to bring together 
portfolio management skills with investment capital.   
Thus, the use of professional fiduciaries is on the rise.55  The default 
rules governing trust investment now require something of a total return in-
vestment strategy consistent with modern portfolio theory.56  The fiduciary obli-
gation has eclipsed limitations on the trustee’s powers as the primary govern-
ance tool for aligning the interests of the trustee, who in the modern private 
trust is vested with vast discretion, with the interests of the beneficiaries.57  All 
of this militates towards the view that, going forward, the study of the law of 
trusts should more closely resemble the study of other organizational forms.  As 
we shall see, this is perhaps clearest with respect to the problem of agency costs 
in the modern managerial trust.   
II. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
For those unfamiliar with the economics of the principal-agent problem 
or the agency cost theories of the firm that the principal-agent problem under-
pins, this Part offers a brief overview.  The goal is to provide context for the ap-
plication of these ideas in Parts III and  IV to the gratuitous private express 
trust.   
A. The Theory of the Firm 
In his 1937 essay, “The Nature of the Firm,” Ronald Coase endeavored to 
understand why some economic activity took place within firms rather than in 
open market transactions.58  Coase’s insight was that such activity would be or-
ganized within firms when the expected costs of allocating resources by internal 
direction were less than the expected transaction costs of undertaking the same 
activity in an open market transaction.59  Coase’s contribution was therefore to 
demonstrate the salience of transaction costs.  From this beginning at least 
three different though complementary modern approaches to the theory of the 
firm have evolved. 
                                                 
55 “Private trustees still abound, but the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid professional, whose 
business is to enter into and carry out trust agreements.”  Langbein, supra note __, at 638.  See also 
Alexander, supra  note __, at 774-75 (“Today, the vast majority of trusts are administered by large finan-
cial institutions, such as trust companies and trust developments of commercial banks.”); Peering into 
Trust Industry Archives, 115 Tr. & Est. 452 (1976).  Several readers of earlier drafts questioned the 
empirical basis for this claim, which warrants further investigation.  See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __.  
The specific point, however, is not critical to the ensuing agency costs analysis, and this empirical study 
is a project for another day. 
56 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
57  See Langbein, supra note __, at 638-43.  See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code:  
Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 Tr. L. Int’l 66, 71 (2001). 
58 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937), reprinted in R.H. Coase, The 
Firm, the Market, and the Law  33-55 (1988). For a general introduction, see Oliver Hart, An Econo-
mist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum L. Rev. 1757 (1989). 
59 Coase, supra note __, at 38  
13
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The transaction costs approach, which is most closely associated with 
Oliver Williamson and is probably the most direct descendent of Coase’s essay, 
focuses on the boundary between the firm and the market.60  Property rights 
theories of the firm, in contrast, are “very much in the spirit of the transaction 
cost literature of Coase and Williamson, but differ by focusing attention on the 
role of physical, that is, nonhuman, assets in a contractual relationship.”61  The 
core relationships that aggregate into the trust as an organizational form, how-
ever, are for the most part open-market transactions rather than intra-firm 
transfers.62  So ne ither the transaction costs nor the property rights approaches 
appear as immediately relevant to the present project as the agency cost theo-
ries. 
Agency cost theories of the firm, which owe their origin to papers by Al-
chian and Demsetz and by Jensen and Meckling, model organizations as webs of 
express, implied, and metaphorical contracts among individuals with conflicting 
interests, all of which revolve around an organizing legal construct.63  So the key 
insight of this so-called “nexus of contracts” approach was to demonstrate the 
importance of principal -agent economics for the study of organizations.  As Jen-
sen and Meckling put it, “Many problems associated with the inadequacy of the 
current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of 
agency relationships, in which there is a growing literature.”64  Hence, the 
agency cost theories of the firm focus on the problems of shirking and monitor-
ing that stem from information asymmetries within the organization’s compo-
nent relationships.  A brief review of the economics of agency is therefore in or-
der.65 
                                                 
60 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:  Firms, Markets, Relational Con-
tracting (1985). 
61 Hart, supra  note __, at 1765 & n. 32.  See Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and 
Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory of Vertical and lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986); Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990). 
62 See Rock & Wactler, supra note __, at 664-66. 
63 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note __, at 778; Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 56, 367 n. 12.   
64 Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 53-54.  See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980). 
65 For accessible and relatively nonmathematical introductions to principal-agent modeling, see Hal R. 
Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics:  A Modern Approach 667-88 (6th ed. 2003); Kenneth J. Arrow, 
The Economics of Agency, in John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principles and Agents:  The 
Structure of Business 37-51 (1985).  See also Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment 
and Review, 14 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 57 (1989).  For accessible formal introductions, see Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston, & Green, supra note __, at 477-510 (1995); Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 440-71 (3d ed. 
1992); David M. Kreps, A course in microeconomic theory 577-719 (1990); Jean-Jacques Laffont & David 
Martimort, The Theory of Inventives:  The Principal-Agent Model (2002). Important scholarly state-
ments include Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency:  The Principal’s Problem, 63 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 134 (1973); Steven Shavell, Risk  sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship, 10 
Bell J. Econ. 55 (1979); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Prob-
lem, 51 Econometrica 7 (1983).  For a basic discussion of the applicability of principal-agent modeling to 
legal problems, see Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in Eric A. Posner, ed., Chi-
cago Lectures in Law and Economics 225 (2000). 
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B. The Economics of Agency 
Using the vocabulary of agency in economic rather than legal parlance,66 
agency problems are caused by the impossibility of complete contracting when 
one party (the agent) has discretionary and unobservable decision-making au-
thority that affects the wealth of another party (the principal).  When the 
agent’s effort is unobservable, ex post enforcement of the ex ante bargain, no 
matter how detailed it may be, is impractical.  The problem is that the principal 
will be unable to ascertain whether a disappointing result was caused by the 
agent’s breach or an exogenous factor.  Thus, unless there is a perfect correlation 
between the agent’s effort and the project’s observable profits, in which case a 
good or bad return would conclusively show the level of the agent’s effort,67 it 
will be difficult for the principal to prevent shirking by the agent.  This is the 
problem of “hidden action,” sometimes called “moral hazard.”68  The problem is 
one of post-contractual asymmetric information.69 
Consider, for example, “a real estate agent on a 5 percent commission.”70  
Assuming the principal cannot feasibly monitor the agent’s day-to-day activities, 
the agent has no incentive to “undertake even $10 worth of effort to improve the 
realized price by $100, because the agent reaps only $5 of this sum.”  But this 
$10 of additional effort would have been in the principal’s best interests.  If the 
parties’ interests were perfectly aligned (as would be the case if the agent were 
selling his or her own property), then the agent would have undertaken the ef-
fort.  The agent’s failure to do so leads to a welfare loss.  True, the divergence in 
this example is an artifact of the 5 percent commission, and a higher commis-
sion of say, 15 percent, would have solved the problem here.  But no compensa-
tion scheme short of transferring complete ownership of the project to the agent 
will solve the incentive problem when the agent’s efforts are unobservable. 
The losses to the parties that stem from such a misalignment of interests 
are called agency costs.  The Jensen and Meckling definition is ubiquitous in the 
legal literature:  “Agency costs” refers to the sum of the costs of the princ ipal’s 
“monitoring efforts,” the costs of the agent’s “bonding efforts,” and the “residual 
                                                 
66 The difference is that a principal-agent relationship in law requires a showing of control. See Re-
statement (Second) of Agency §§ 1; Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 & cmt. c (T.D. No. 2, approved 
2001).  Cf. Allen & Kraakman, supra note __, at § 2.3.3, p. 36. 
67 See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1049-51 (1991); Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, supra  
note __, at 478-79. 
68 See Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, supra note __, at 477 n. 1. 
69 A nice statement may be found at Laffont & Marimort, supra note __, at 3 (emphasis in orig inal): 
The starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of delegating a task to 
an agent with private information.  This private information can be of two types: either 
the agent can take an action unobserved by the principal, the case of moral hazard or 
hidden action; or the agent has some private knowledge about his cost or valuation that 
is ignored by the principal, the case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge. 
70 This illustration is taken from Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 91.  See also Posner, supra 
note __, at 225-29. 
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loss” as measured by the “dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experi-
enced by the principal as a result of” the divergence in the principal’s and the 
agent’s interests.71  In the foregoing example the lost $100 increase in the sale 
price would count as residual loss.   
C. Agency Costs and Organizational Forms 
Returning to the agency cost theories of the firm, the arresting insight of 
Jensen and Meckling’s nexus of contracts model was to show that the study of 
organizational forms involves more concretely the study of clusters or webs of 
discrete principal-agent relationships.72  Accordingly, subsequent research has 
explored the effectiveness of various devices, legal and otherwise, at minimizing 
agency costs within different organizational forms; and this literature has 
thrown light on the governance features that help distinguish different organ-
izational forms from each other.73  In particular, the literature of enterprise or-
ganizations has explored managerial labor markets,74 incentive compensation,75 
alienable residual claims,76 flexible sharing rules and mutual monitoring,77 the 
market for corporate control (i.e., the takeover market),78 disclosure rules,79 and 
liability rules such as fiduciary duties,80 as devices for minimizing agency costs.   
The private express trust has not been similarly subjected to systematic 
agency costs analysis.81 
                                                 
71 Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 53-55.   
72 See supra notes 63-64 and text accompanying. 
73 See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 311-21; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organiza-
tional Forms and Investment Decisions, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 103 (1985).  Cf. Ogus, supra note __, at 195. 
74 See, e.g., Fama, supra note __, at 295. 
75 See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Share-
holder Expropriation?, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 123 (2000); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, 
in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics 2485 (1999); Symposium on 
Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. (1985).  See also 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (2002). 
76 See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 332-33. 
77 See id. at 335-37 (discussing professional partnerships). 
78 See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965); 
Symposium on the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. Fin. Econ. (1983); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002). 
79 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1047 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669 (1984). 
80 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in 
Corporate Law:  A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986); sources cited in 
infra note __. 
81 See supra note __. 
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III. THE AGENCY COSTS MODEL  
In comparison to the agency costs approach to corporate law,82 the agency 
costs approach to trust law will be both simpler and more complex.  It is in some 
respects simpler, because the trust is a less complicated organization.  This 
makes the agency costs analysis and reckoning the hypothetical bargain of the 
principal parties easier.  In other respects it is more complicated, however, be-
cause the actions of the ind ividuals interested in the trust are not metered by 
price signals from efficient capital markets.83  Moreover, the law regularly sub-
ordinates the interests of the beneficiaries as residual clai mants to the dead 
hand interests of the settlor, an outgrowth of the frequently paternalistic func-
tion of the donative trust.84   
A. The Contractarian Nexus 
The trust is more than a simple contract between private parties.  It is 
an organizational form with in rem as well as in personam dimensions.  Thus, 
like the corporation and other organizational forms, the trust blends an external 
in rem asset partitioning dynamic with internal  in personam contractarian 
flexibility.  The trust’s internal relationships are contractarian in that the law 
supplies default terms around which the parties may contract; and they are con-
tractarian in that the underlying governance problems posed by the asymmetric 
information of the parties are amenable to principal-agent modeling.   
True, there is tension between the contractarian metaphor and the posi-
tion of the beneficiary.  Beneficiaries are not normally thought to give ex ante 
consent and they are typically in no position to bargain.  Moreover, as discussed 
in Part I, there remains much debate about whether the beneficiaries’ stake in 
the trust is a species of obligation or property law.  But even if the beneficiaries 
do not literally contract with the other principal parties, and even if the benefi-
ciaries’ stake is doctrinally more proprietary than contractarian, the problems of 
governance relevant to the beneficiaries’ welfare are nonetheless illuminated by 
contractarian principal-agent modeling.  From an economic perspective, hidden 
action (and possibly hidden information) abounds, so trust governance must con-
front both incentive and risk-sharing problems.85  Accordingly, greater insight 
into the nature and function of trust law will come from a conception of the trust 
as a de facto legal entity that serves as the organizing construct for an aggrega-
tion of contractarian relationships.  This vision of the trust is analogous to the 
                                                 
82 The model of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, which has most notably been advanced by 
Easterbook & Fischel, supra note __, is the clearest example. 
83 See generally Sitkoff, supra note __.  The trust has this in common with the close corporation.  See 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs , 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271, 
274-77 (1986).   
84 See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts:  Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First Century 
Planning, 50 Rec. Assoc. Bar N.Y. 140 (1995). 
85 See generally Eisenhardt, supra note __, at 58. 
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Jensen and Meckling nexus of contracts model of the firm,86 and as was the case 
for their analysis of the corporation, it implies the viability of agency costs 
analysis for trust law.   
Thus, to return to the exemplary trust described in the introduction, 
which was settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the con-
stituent relationships include those between S and T; T and the Bs; S and the 
Bs; T and T’s creditors; the Bs and creditors of the Bs; S and S’s creditors; S and 
a character known as the trust “protector” (who will be introduced later);87 the 
Bs and the trust “protector”; T and the agents to whom T delegates authority; 
and T’s delegates and the Bs.88  The dominant (and sometimes conflicting) rela-
tionships are between S and T and between the Bs and T. 
Denaturing the trust into its constituent relationships brings into view 
the applicability of hypothetical bargain analysis and the economics of the prin-
cipal-agent problem.  For if they are characterized by reference to their underly-
ing economics, both the relationship between S and T and the relationship be-
tween the Bs and T might be modeled on the principal-agent scheme.  The for-
mer is the temporal agency problem that helps distinguish the economic analy-
sis of trust law from that of corporate law.89  The latter is the traditional agency 
problem when risk-bearing is separated from management.  This means that 
there is the potential for considerable tension between T’s loyalty to S and T’s 
loyalty to the Bs.  As we shall see in the next Part, American trust law resolves 
this tension by requiring T to maximize the welfare of the Bs within the ex ante 
                                                 
86 “It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus 
for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. . . . By ‘legal fiction’ we mean the artificial con-
struct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals. . . .  The private 
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction that serves as a nexus for contracting relation-
ships.”  Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 56 & 367 n. 12.  Cf. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note __, at 
778; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 11-12. 
87 See infra Part IV.B.4. 
88 See, e.g., In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423 (1952); In re Kellogg,  N.Y.L.J. 25 (Dec. 
30, 1999).  The importance of the relations that fall into these last two categories has increased with the 
assimilation of portfolio theory into modern prudent investor standards.  Current law now permits and 
might even require amateur trustees to delegate investment authority to professionals—what Langbein 
has called the “fractionation of trusteeship.” John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and 
the Future of Trust Investing, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641, 665-66 (1996).  See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 
9 (1994); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 & cmt. f (1992); John H. Langbein, 
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law , 59 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1994).  See also Lang-
bein, supra note __, at 72-73.  Prudent investor rules in the U.K. are undergoing a similar shift.  See, 
e.g., Penelope Reed & Richard Wilson, The Trustee Act 2000:  A Practical Guide  (2001).  These scenarios 
might be amenable to modeling as a common agency. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 
Common Agency, 54 Econometrica 923 (1986).  See also Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask 
Principal—Agency Analyses: Inventive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. L. Econ. & 
Org. 24 (1991); Hideshi Itoh, Incentive to Help in Multi-Agent Situations, 59 Econometrica 611 (1991); 
Joel S. Demski, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents, 33 J. Econ. Theory 152 (1984); 
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral hazard in teams , 13 Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982). 
89 And agency law too.  Legal agency requires the ongoing existence of a principal under whose control 
the agent acts.  This enables the agent to seek clarification from the principal and the principal to main-
tain watch over the agent. 
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constraints imposed by S.  This is to say that under the American (but not nec-
essarily the English) approach the donor’s intent controls. 
B. The Office of the Trustee 
The office of the trustee is in effect (though not formally) a separate en-
tity from the trustee personally.  This separate entity-like effect, which stems 
from the trust’s partitioning of assets, implicates an in rem dynamic as it is ef-
fective against nonparties to the trust.  The de facto office of trustee serves as 
the organizing hub for the various relations that aggregate into the private 
trust.90   
With respect to creditors, turnover within the office of trustee and/or the 
personal insolvency of a particular trustee does not affect the continuity of the 
trust.  Deals struck by a prior trustee as such bind successor trustees to the ex-
tent that they would have been enforceable against the prior trustee when in 
office.91  The prior trustee, however, has no office-based liability to creditors of 
the trust once out of office unless he or she personally guaranteed the obligation.  
No trustee, whether in or out of office, has personal liability to outside creditors 
of the trust unless he or she personally guaranteed the obligation.92  And the 
personal creditors of an insolvent trustee—a rather rare phenomenon in dona-
tive trusts but an important consideration for commercial trusts—have no re-
course against the assets of the trust.93 
Moreover, the rules that govern the trustee’s liability towards creditors of 
the trust property tend to be mandatory with respect to the settlor but default 
with respect to the trustee and those with whom the trustee deals.94  They are 
mandatory with respect to the settlor, because as to the settlor these rules have 
an in rem quality—they touch on the rights of outsiders.95  And they are default 
                                                 
90 Cf. Hayton, supra note __, at 155. 
91 See, e.g., Wood v. Potter, 289 N.W. 131, 133 (Mich. 1939); Schroeder v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 510 
N.E.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Ill. App. 1987). The qualification addresses the possibi lity of self-dealing or other 
grounds for voiding the transaction, and indeed the failure of a successor to pursue such remedies would 
be an independent breach of trust.  See infra note 97 and text accompanying. 
92 See, e.g., UTC § 1010(a).  The traditional rule of personal liability unless provided otherwise, see IIIA 
Scott on Trusts § 261, p. 417; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 265 & cmt. a, can be understood as a 
penalty default that forces trustees to disclose that they are operating in a representative rather than 
individual capacity.  See Hansman & Mattei, supra note __, at 459-61; Merrill & Smith, supra note __, 
at 846-47.   
93 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 454 & n. 64 (collecting authority).  See generally MacNair, 
supra note __, at 224-29. 
94 See, e.g., UTC 1010(a); UTC § 105(b)(11) (“The terms of a trust prevail over [common and statutory 
law] except . . . the rights under Sections 1010 through 1013 of a person other than a trustee or benefi-
ciary.”); UTC Art. 10 gen. cmt. (“The settlor may not limit the rights of persons other than beneficiaries 
as provided in Sections 1010 through 1013.”).  See generally John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the 
Law of Trusts (manuscript on file with author); Langbein, supra note __, at 76-79 (analyzing the UTC’s 
mandatory features); English, supra note __, at 27.  Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 263; IIIA Scott 
on Trusts § 263, pp. 423-32.   
95 On similar reasoning agency law does not allow principals to opt out of liability to third parties on an 
apparent authority theory.  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 160-61. 
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with respect to the trustee and outside creditors, because as to them these rules 
concern only in personam matters.  Parties may fix their rights with respect to 
each other; but when outsiders are implicated, the law cabins the parties’ flexi-
bility.  
The rules of trustee liability towards beneficiaries are quite different, but 
the distinctions follow naturally from the implication of the nexus of contracts 
model of organizational forms that it is the trustee personally who agrees to 
manage the assets held by the trustee as trustee.  Thus, the beneficiaries may 
seek to surcharge a trustee personally for breach of trust not only while in office 
but also after the trustee has been sacked; removal does not extinguish the trus-
tee’s personal liability for breaches committed while in office.96  The breaching 
trustee’s successor, however, is not personally liable to the beneficiaries for the 
prior trustee’s breach unless the successor unreasonably fails to discover and 
rectify the prior breach.  But liability in this scenario stems from the successor 
trustee’s own breach.97  
What is more, the rules of internal trust governance, which is to say the 
in personam rights inter se of the beneficiaries, the settlor, and the trustee, are 
for the most part default as to the settlor.98  That not all of these rules are de-
fault, however, suggests that there is an irreducible foundation of trust govern-
ance law that is mandatory.  Indeed, as Langbein explains in a contemporaneous 
article on trust law’s mandatory rules, even though a settlor may opt out of indi-
vidual fiduciary duties, he cannot authorize a “bad faith” trusteeship or oust fi-
duciary law in its entirety. 99   
Part of the explanation for these limits are the obvious agency costs con-
sequences of giving the trustee unfettered discretion.  As the Delaware Supreme 
Court put it in a recent opinion, “A trust in which there is no legally binding ob-
ligation on a trustee is a trust in name only.”100  But there is more.  Further ex-
planation lies in the necessity of keeping clear for third-parties who would deal 
with the trustee the distinction between property transferred to the trustee in 
trust versus outright gifts or other forms of limited transfer such as equitable 
charges.101  So there is a mandatory irreducible minimum of trust governance, 
                                                 
96 As a practical matter this liability will almost always be fixed in an accounting proceeding made inci-
dent to the removal action. 
97 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 223; III Scott on Trusts § 223, pp. 395-96.  This explains why 
many professionally-drafted trustee succession provisions absolve the successor from this audit respon-
sibility.  Without that absolution, many potential successors would decline to serve.  For further discus-
sion and references, see Vollmar, Hess, & Whitman, supra note __, at 1072-73. 
98 See, e.g., UTC § 105; Langbein, supra note __. 
99 See Langbein, manuscript supra note __.  The motivation for doing so is often to deny entitlement to 
beneficiaries who the settlor wants to benefit, but not too much—not any further than the settlor’s dele-
gate, the trustee, would otherwise allow. 
100 McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002). 
101 Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note __.  An equitable charge is created when one party transfers property 
to another, not subject to a fiduciary obligation (indeed the transferee is permitted to benefit personally 
from the transferred property), but nevertheless subject to the right of a third party to receive a pay-
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not only to serve a protective and cautionary function for the settlor who would 
otherwise swamp his or her beneficiary in an agency costs morass (a goal that 
might have been achieved with a penalty default102), but also because on this 
issue the in personam (i.e., internal governance) converges with the in rem (i.e., 
external relations authority).103 
C. The Relative Position of the Settlor 
The settlor’s intent to create a trust is a prerequisite to trust forma-
tion.104  This means that Langbein’s third-party beneficiary contract between 
the settlor and the trustee is the trigger, as it were, for the set of individual re-
lationships that compose the trust.  The settlor-trustee relationship is indeed 
contractual, as settlors and trustees are free to dicker over the terms of the trust 
such as compensation (even if in fact they do not).105  This leads to three points. 
First, as Langbein has shown, when interpreting the trustee’s obligations 
under the trust instrument, an intention-seeking standard is normatively desir-
able.106  This prescription follows from the insight that in the case of a voluntary 
transaction between adults, the joint intent of the parties carries a presumption 
of pareto optimality.107  Not surprisingly, the new Restatement of Property for 
donative transfers points in this direction,108 a positive trend that is also consis-
tent with the idea of the settlor as the dominant principal.  Moreover, for the 
usual transaction-costs-savings reasons, the underlying law of trust governance 
should supply those terms for which the majority of settlors and trustees would 
have dickered with full information and low negotiation costs.109  “The proper 
                                                                                                                                          
ment from the transferee.  See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 5(h) & cmt. h; I Scott on Trusts §§ 
10, 10.3, 10.4; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 10 & cmts. a-b; Ogle v. Durley,  77 So.2d 688, 691-92 
(Miss. 1955). 
102 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note __. 
103 For further discussion, see Langbein, manuscript supra  note __; infra Part IV.C. 
104 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 13; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 23; UTC § 402(a)(2). 
105 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note __, at 639, 651.  See also Getzler, supra note __, at 4.  Whether or not 
there is much dickering in practice doesn’t alter the contractual nature of the underlying relationship.  
All that a lack of actual bargaining suggests is that either (i) the default rules (or, more clearly, the 
standardized forms and fee schedules typically used by corporate fiduciaries) closely approximate me-
dian preferences, or (ii) amateurs such as family members who are dragged into the role are motivated 
by altruism rather than fees, and indeed such amateurs often receive no fees at all.  See also Langbein, 
supra note __, at 639 & n. 66 (comparing the marketing of trust services with the sales of vacuum clean-
ers). 
106 Langbein, supra note __, at 663-64.  See also Halbach, supra note __ at 1881; Parkinson, supra note 
__, at 676-79; Cf. Hayton, supra note __, at 96. 
107 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 80-82 (1995); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note __, at 22-25. 
108 “The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s 
intention.  The donor’s intent is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”  Restatement 
(Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 (2003).   
109 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 15.6, p. 454 (6th ed. 2003); Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note __, at 89-91 (collecting scholarly statements); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health and 
Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.) (ERISA).  See also Posner, at § 
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question becomes: What was the intention of the parties to the trust deal re-
specting this point, and if they did not articulate their intention on this matter, 
which default rule captures the likely bargain they would have struck had they 
thought about it.”110   
Second, in view of the potential ex ante informational asymmetries be-
tween repeat-player trust lawyers and institutional fiduciaries on the one hand, 
and settlors on the other, there is room in the law of trusts as a normative mat-
ter for the occasional welfare-enhancing, information-forcing penalty default 
rule.111  And indeed as a positive matter such penalty defaults do exist.  Perhaps 
the most salient example concerns clauses that exculpate the trustee from liabil-
ity to the beneficiaries for breach of trust.  Before enforcing these exoneration 
clauses, courts often require a showing that the settlor had affirmative knowl-
edge of the clause and its meaning.112  By forcing this term to be transparent, 
the rule helps to ensure that the exculpation clause was not mere boilerplate 
unwittingly embraced by the settlor. 
Third, in contrast to the founder of a corporation or a commercial trust,113 
the settlor of a donative private trust receives no direct price signal about the 
quality of the governance arrangement to which he or she agrees with the trus-
tee.114  There is no public offering for beneficial interests in a donative private 
trust, and potential beneficiaries don’t purchase their rights from the settlor.  So 
the only price signal in donative trusts about potential governance structures is 
both weak and ambiguous—the level of commissions, if any, demanded by the 
trustee.115   In conjunction with the potential for informational asymmetries 
noted just above, this bolsters the case for the occasional information-forcing de-
                                                                                                                                          
4.1, p. 96, § 14.3, p. 413, § 14.7, pp. 427-28.  This is an implication of R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
110 Langbein, supra note __, at 664.   
111 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note __.  The informational asymmetry between trust lawyers and 
settlor/clients is a source of agency costs in the legal market. 
112 See III Scott on Trusts § 222.4, pp. 393-95; UTC § 1008(b) & cmt (“Subsection (b) responds to the 
danger that the insertion of such a clause by the fiduciary or its agent may have been undisclosed or 
inadequately understood by the settlor.”); Restatement (Second) § 222(3) & cmt d.  See also Langbein, 
manuscript supra note __, at 33-34; Report on Exculpation Clauses in Trust Instruments:  Committee 
on the Modernization of the Trustee Act, 22 Est. Tr. Pen. J. 55 (2003) (Canadian law); David Hayton, 
English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law , 32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 555, 580 (1999) (English law); Lang-
bein, supra note __, at 74-75 (discussing the UTC).    
113 See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 562. 
114 Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 58: 
[T]he owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so long as the 
equity market anticipates these effects.  Prospective minority shareholders will real-
ize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs; hence the 
price which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of 
the divergence between the manger’s interest and theirs. 
115 The signal is weak in both directions.  Professionals often have company-wide fee schedules, and 
amateurs such as family members often serve without commission.  See supra note 105. 
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fault rule and/or in some cases possibly even disregarding the intent of the 
settlor.116 
None of this is to suggest that settlors are disinterested in the quality of 
the trust’s governance regime.  To the contrary, a common purpose in settling a 
trust in the first place, tax exigencies and controlling personal ities to one side,117 
is to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries.  The point of the prior paragraph 
is that settlors do not receive the sort of price signals that would force them ac-
curately to internalize the costs and benefits of the governance arrangement to 
which they agree with the trustee.  Hence, to paraphrase the condition posited 
by Easterbrook and Fischel as necessary for skepticism about a term in the cog-
nate context of the corporate contract, the consequences for beneficiary welfare 
of the terms of the trust might “not have been appreciated by” the settlor.118   
D. Beneficiaries as Residual Claimants 
The trustee, individuals hired by the trustee to assist in the trust’s man-
agement, and those who do business with the trustee as trustee all have fixed 
claims on the trust corpus that generally have priority over the claims of the 
beneficiaries.  Trustees are free to negotiate for their own fee schedules or other 
terms designed to protect their interests,119 and those who do business with the 
trustee over trust assets can likewise protect themselves by contract.  Benefici-
aries of donative trusts, however, are limited to taking so much as the trust in-
strument allows out of whatever is left of the trust’s assets when everyone else 
is done.120  “The residual risk—the risk of the difference between stochastic [i.e., 
variable] inflows of resources and promised payments to agents—is borne by 
those who contract for the rights to net cash flows.  We call these agents the re-
sidual claimants or residual risk bearers.”121  
To say that the be neficiaries are the residual claimants is to say that 
managerial decisions are infra-marginal for all the relevant players except for 
the beneficiaries.  This may provide an agency costs explanation for why the de-
fault rule for irrevocable trusts is that only the beneficiaries may sue the trustee 
                                                 
116 For further discussion and references, see Langbein, manuscript supra note __. 
117 Anecdotes from practitioners suggest that some settlors are so control-oriented that their chief moti-
vation is to maintain dominance over their family after death, seeking not just to minimize taxes but 
sometimes even sacrificing that goal in order to maintain control over the beneficiaries’ behavior.  See 
also infra note 196.  For discussion of strategic intergenerational transfers, see B. Douglas Bernheim, 
Andrei Shleifer, & Lawrence H. Summers, The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1045 (1985). 
118 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 17, 23-25, 31.  Cf. Langbein, manuscript supra note __, at 
Part II. 
119 See supra note __ and text accompanying. 
120 The limitation to donative trusts is necessary because in the commercial context the settlor is often 
the residual claimant.  In these cases the beneficiaries are typically investors in trust certif icates that, 
like debt, only entitle the investors to a return of their investment plus interest.  Thereafter any surplus 
value goes back to the settlor.  See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 562-53. 
121 Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 328.  Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 67-70. 
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for a breach of trust.122  And on the same reasoning the default fiduciary obliga-
tions of the trustee are designed to create incentives for the trustee to manage 
the trust from the beneficiaries’ (and hence the marginal) perspective.  The 
trend towards the managerial trust, moreover, increases the significance of the 
beneficiaries’ residual position.  Now that the trust is used for more than inter-
generational conveyances and the preservation of ancestral land, status as a 
trust beneficiary brings both greater potential risk and greater potential re-
ward.123   
Against the foregoing it might be argued that because private trust bene-
ficiaries are nothing more than passive recipients of a donative transfer, the 
analogy to Jensen and Meckling’s nexus of contracts metaphor does not hold.  
Indeed, even though acceptance (which can be implied) is a required element of 
every gift,124 trust beneficiaries do not give consent to their status as such in the 
same way that parties give consent to a literal contractual relationship. But the 
nexus of contracts model is just that, a model; and the economics of agency does 
provide a helpful framework for understanding the law’s default solutions to 
problems of governance. 
Hence, an important further benefit of the agency costs approach to trust 
law is that it invites comparison of the trust to other organizational forms.  This 
expands the potential for drawing on empirical insights, albeit if only by anal-
ogy.  Thus far, the typical trust law empirical project has been comparative.  Al-
though the common law trust is uniquely Anglo-American,125 there is nontrivial 
variation within the common law countries;126 and naturally there is also utility 
to studying how the non common law countries have adapted to their nominal 
lack of an explicit law of trusts.127  But this comparative approach tends to be 
qualitative rather than quantitative, no doubt because of the difficulty in obtain-
ing good data on trusts in practice.128  In contrast, thick capital markets provide 
ample data for quantitative analysis of theoretical predictions about the impact 
                                                 
122 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200; III Scott on Trusts §§ 200, 200.1.  But see infra Parts 
IV.B.3. and IV.B.4. 
123 See Langbein, supra  note __, at 642. 
124 See Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 6.1 & cmt i. 
125 In fairness, however, it must be noted that many of the civil law countries have long had trust-like 
devices.  See Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann, View of Trust and Treuhand:  An Introduc-
tion 27-31, in Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra note __.  See also Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust,  
32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 967 (1999); Adair Dyer, International Recognition and Adaption of Trusts:  The 
Influence of the Hague Convention, 32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 989 (1999); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Hague 
Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About Very Little , 3 J. Int. Tr. Corp. Plan. 5 (1994). 
126 Several examples are discussed in infra Part IV.  
127 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 435-36; Donovan Waters, Private Foundations (Civil Law) 
versus Trusts (Common Law), 21 Ests., Tr. & Pens. J. 281 (2002); Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra note 
__.  See also Langbein, supra note __, at 669-71. 
128 See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __; Langbein, supra note __, at 178. 
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of corporate law on shareholder welfare.129  So analogical comparisons to the 
empirical literature on whether specific corporate governance mechanisms im-
prove investor welfare might help inform the analysis of whether specific trust 
governance mechanisms improve beneficiary welfare.   
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL  
By reference to illustrative applications, this Part demonstrates the posi-
tive and normative power of the agency costs approach.  The normative claim is 
that the law of private trusts should minimize the agency costs inherent to lo-
cating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the 
beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante 
instructions of the settlor.  The qualification gives priority to the settlor over the 
beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary principal.  Hence, to return once again to 
our exemplary trust settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, 
this means that T should maximize the welfare of B1 and B2 subject to the ex 
ante limits imposed by S.  Consequently, the optimal solution to the Bs/T princi-
pal-agent problem, which is for the Bs to sell the residual claim to T (doing so 
would solve both the incentive and risk-sharing problems),130 is foreclosed by the 
settlor’s choice of the trust over an outright transfer.  So in view of the exigency 
of honoring the paternalistic motives of the donative settlor, the best that the 
law of trust governance can hope for is a second-best solution to the Bs/T agency 
problem. 
The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines, 
the law of trusts conforms to the suggested normative approach.  Indeed, as 
Edward Halbach, the Reporter for the new Third Restatement of Trusts recently 
observed, a “theme” in modern trust law “is flexibility and efficiency in the pur-
suit of the best interests of the beneficiaries within the settlor’s legally permis-
sible objectives.”131    
A. Donative Beneficiaries as Residual Claimants  
As we have seen, agency costs analysis would have us classify the benefi-
ciaries of donative trusts as “residual claimants.”  Claims on the assets of the 
trust by all the other relevant parties—most notably the trustee and those with 
whom the trustee transacts as trustee—are usually set by express contract and 
have a higher priority than the beneficiaries’ claim.  Thus, like the residual 
claimants in any other organizational form, donative trust beneficiaries bear the 
residual risk of good or bad performance.  Put more formally, managerial deci-
sions regarding the trust’s assets are usually infra-marginal to all but the bene-
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Cor-
proate Litigation, 4 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies 
and the Law: Part II – Empirical Studies of Corporate Law , 4 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 380 (2002). 
130 See Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, supra  note __, at 482-83.  This assumes that T is either risk-
neutral or at least less risk-averse than the Bs.  See infra  Part IV.A.3. 
131 Halbach, supra  note 21, at 1881.  See also Ogus, supra note __, at 205. 
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ficiaries.  The emergence of the managerial trust, moreover, has enlarged the 
range of the beneficiaries’ potential risk and reward.132  In this respect modern 
trust beneficiaries are beginning more closely to resemble the residual claimants 
of other organizational forms than the trust beneficiaries of yore. 
Yet today’s typical donative trust beneficiaries have some interesting 
characteristics, relevant to reckoning the probable intent of the settlor, that dis-
tinguish them from the residual claimants of other organizational forms.  In 
view of these characteristics and the relevant agency costs analysis, this section 
explains the operation of three rules of private trust governance as consistent 
with the likely preferences of the parties.  In other words, these distinguishing 
characteristics reflect important empirical assumptions that underpin the hypo-
thetical bargain that is encoded in traditional trust doctrine.133  When choosing 
an organizational form, one looks for the form in which the default empirical as-
sumptions about risk-preferences, the number of residual claimants, the thick-
ness of the relevant markets, and so on most closely resemble one’s own situa-
tion.  Doing so minimizes the transaction costs of customizing the form to fit 
one’s particular needs.134 
1. The duty of impartiality.  The law of trusts nicely facilitates the crea-
tion of residual claimants with interests adverse to each other.  The still classic 
example, here described with reference to our exemplary private trust, is a trust 
for the lifetime income benefit of one party (say, B1) with the remainder princi-
pal benefit to another (say, B2).  As residual c laimants B1 and B2’s overall inter-
ests are grossly aligned on matters such as self-dealing or embezzlement by T.  
But often their specific interests in the day-to-day management of the trust will 
not be congruent.  The most obvious example is that B1 should prefer income-
producing investments while B2 should prefer capital appreciation.135  This cre-
ates “conflicts among the claim holders of different states because alternative 
decisions shift payoffs across states and benefit some claim holders at the ex-
pense of others.”136   
Trust law’s amenability to having residual claimants with adverse inter-
ests thus poses a challenge for crafting an effective governance regime, because 
the preference set of the residual claimants, in whose interests the trust should 
be managed, may not be coherent.  In corporate law, by comparison, the basic 
aim of profit-maximization is assumed to be shared by all shareholders (their 
                                                 
132 See Langbein, supra  note __, at 637-43. 
133 Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 
Del. J. Corp. L. 499 (2002). 
134 See, e.g., Ogus, supra note __, at 187. 
135 See, e.g., Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984); Dobris, supra  note 
__, at 569-71.  See also Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Div idends to Capital Gain 
and Debt Investments to Equity—A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. 
J. 255 (1997).   
136 Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 329. 
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preferences are said to be “single-peaked”), which helps corporate governance 
avoid the well-known pathologies of agenda manipulation and cycling.137   
Trust law’s evolutionary response for aggregating the otherwise conflict-
ing interests of different classes of beneficiaries is the fiduciary duty of imparti-
ality.138  The duty of impartiality requires the trustee to “act impartially in in-
vesting, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the 
beneficiaries’ respective interests.”139  Thus, under the default trust governance 
arrangement, T cannot justify an action as benefiting B1 over B2.  Instead, T 
must justify his or her actions in relation to the aggregate welfare of B1 and 
B2—i.e., of all the residual claimants—as a class.  In effect, the trust’s residual 
claimants’ interests are made coherent by directing the trustee to act in view of 
their needs rather than their individual wants.  The overarching directive of the 
duty of impartiality is that of balance.140  
This seems consistent with the settlor’s probable intent.  True, in the 
foregoing example one might argue that because S intended B1 to receive an 
immediate benefit and intended B2 to receive only the residue on the death of 
B1, S rated B1’s position as superior to B2’s.  But that seems a thin basis for 
concluding that S wanted T to prefer the interests of B1 over B2.  If S had such 
a preference, it would have been simple enough to put something to that effect 
in the trust instrument; and in the absence of such language, given the gratui-
tous basis of the traditional private trust, we assume that S wanted T to exer-
cise discretion in balancing the interests of the named beneficiaries over time in 
view of the specific context.141  This stands in contrast to the law of corporations, 
which requires managers to favor the most residual of the residual claimants in 
the case of conflict between them,142 though of course within the same class of 
                                                 
137 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corpo-
rate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1110 n. 28 (2002); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Ques-
tion: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1611–12 (1989); Frank 
H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law , 26 J. L. & Econ. 395, 405–06 (1983).   
138 “Unfortunately, over the years, the true nature and implications of the duty of impartia lity have 
been little explained, and vaguely defined at best, in the cases and literature.”  Halbach, supra note __, 
at 1912. 
139 UTC § 803.  See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 183, 232.   
140 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 cmts. c & i; Halbach, supra note __, 
at 549; Halbach, supra note __, at 1913; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third 
Restatement, 27 Real Prop., Prob, & Tr. J. 407, 441-45 (1992). 
141 Thus, the trustee “has considerable discretion in preserving the balance between the beneficiaries.”  
Scott on Trusts § 232, p. 232.  This means that “balance” is not synonymous with equal treatment.  
Thus if B1 was S’s widow and B2 was a distant cousin, then T could lawfully tip the balance in favor of 
B1.  “There is . . . no absolute rule on this matter and under some circumstances [favoring the life or 
remainder beneficiaries] might be justified.”  Id. 
142 See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law  § 14.5, 
p. 636 (1986); Bainbridge, supra  note __, at § 7.4, p. 342. 
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stock all shareholders must be treated equally.143  Trust law’s duty of impartial-
ity applies both within and across beneficiary classes. 
From this perspective the duty of impartiality is both a critical feature of 
trust governance and a salient distinguishing default characteristic of trust law 
as organizational law.  It is a critical feature of private trust governance, be-
cause without it often there would be no coherent set of residual claimants in 
whose interests the trust’s managers should operate.  And it is a salient distin-
guishing default characteristic of the law of private trusts, relevant to choice of 
form for commercial transactions,144 because the duty is not an explicit part of 
the default fiduciary obligation of the managers of most other organizational 
forms.   
Thus the law of trusts has considerable experience with the problem of 
balancing the interests of claim holders of different states, and this might be a 
reason to choose the deal reflected within trust law’s default governance regime 
over the deal reflected by the default governance arrangements of other organi-
zations.145  As Steven Schwarcz has explained, one “should consider using the 
trust form of business organization where residual claimants do no t expect 
management to favor their class of claims over senior claimants.”146 
2. Total return investing. Complementing the duty of impartiality is the 
modern trend towards total return investing.147  Motivated by the teachings of 
modern portfolio theory,148 total return investing has been codified in the recent 
revisions to the prudent investor standards that underpin trust law’s fiduc iary 
duty of care.149  The basic idea is that trustees are to craft a diversified portfolio 
in view of its balance of overall rather than investment-specific risk and poten-
tial return.150  A contemporaneous reform revised the definitions of “princ ipal” 
                                                 
143  The clearest application of this principle is the rule against non-pro-rata distributions, which 
prevents controlling shareholders from favoring themselves.  See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 
A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 7.4, pp. 338-40. 
144 See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 575-80. 
145 Reasoning along similar lines, Daniel Fischel and John Langbein have suggested “that the duty of 
impartiality should be imported into pension law” as a response to the frequency of adverse interests 
among pension fund beneficiaries.  Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental 
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule , 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1119-21, 1159-60 (1988).  And 
indeed courts have done just that.  For discussion and references, see John H. Langbein & Bruce A. 
Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law  680, 848 (3d ed. 2000).   
146 Schwarcz, supra note __, at 579. 
147 See, e.g., Lyman W. Welch, Brave New World of Total Return Laws, Tr. & Est. 24 (June 2002). 
148 See, e.g., Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory (2d ed. 1998).  Influential early appli-
cations to trust-investment law include John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and 
Trust- Investment Law , 1976 Am. B. F. Res. J. 1; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds 
and Trust- Investment Law: II, 1977 Am. B. F. Res. J. 1; Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Man-
agement and the Prudent Man Rule  (1986).  See also Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and 
Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 721 (1976). 
149 See generally Halbach, supra note __; Langbein, supra  note 88.  
150 See Uniform Prudent Investor Act §§ 2-3; Restatement (Third) of Trusts:  Prudent Investor Rule § 
227(a).  See also John H. Langbein, The New American trust-investment Act , 8 Tr. L. Int’l 123, 123-24 
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and “income,” making porous the boundary between the two.151  Together, total 
return investing and more flexible definitions of principal and income have the 
potential to ease the tension between lifetime and remainder beneficiaries by 
refocusing the trustee’s balancing of their interests on a more transparent mar-
gin—namely, the ex post allocation to one or the other of the trust’s total return 
receipts.152 
Specifically, the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act refocuses the 
tension between capital appreciation and present income production on the trus-
tee’s ex post power “equitably” to “adjust” the classification of specific 
investment returns within the total return portfolio as “income” or “principal.”153  
The so-called unitrust,154 which is an alternative to equitable adjustment that 
provides a fixed percentage of the trust corpus each year to the “income” 
beneficiaries with the remainder left for the “principal” beneficiaries,155 likewise 
eases the tension.   
With equitable adjustment or a unitrust, the higher the total return, the 
better all the beneficiaries do.156  The latter does so with less discretion and so 
fewer agency costs.  But it less perfectly aligns the interests of the income and 
principal beneficiaries, because much of the potential upside from higher risk 
investments will accrue to the principal beneficiaries.  The former somewhat 
better aligns the beneficiaries’ interests, but it does so with higher agency costs 
because it gives the trustee additional discretion.  Still, the exercise of this dis-
cretion is more transparent than the former approach of hiding the problem be-
hind the portfolio’s initial allocation between income -producing and capital-
appreciating investments.   
Thus the trend towards total return investing, like the duty of impartial-
ity, can be understood as the sort of agency-costs-minimizing rules to which the 
parties probably would have agreed had dickering been feasible.  Indeed, in lar-
ger trusts that were to be managed by professional trustees, opting out of the 
                                                                                                                                          
(1994).  Damages in surcharge actions for imprudence should likewise reflect the total return impera-
tive.  See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __.  
151 Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997). 
152 See Halbach, supra  note __, at 1913-14.  See also Langbein, supra  note 88, at 666-69.  For a further, 
economically- informed discussion of principal and income, see Gordon, supra note __, at 99-112.  
153 Uniform Principal and Income Act §§ 103-04.  See generally Joel C. Dobris, New Forms of Private 
Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and Income, 31 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1 (1996); Joel 
C. Dobris, The Probate World at the End of the New Century: Is a New Principal and Income Act in 
Your Future?, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 393 (1993). 
154 See, e.g., 12 Del. C. § 3527; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-2.4; IL P.A. 92-0838. 
155 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 88, at 669; Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio 
Theory, and Private Trusts:  Drafting and Administration Including the “Give-Me-Five” Unitrust, 33 
Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1 (1998); Robert B. Wolf, Total Return Trusts—Can Your Clients Afford Any-
thing Less? , 33 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 131 (1998).  Cf. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio 
Theory, and College University, and Foundation Decisions on Annual spending from Endowments:  A 
Visit to the World of Spending Rules, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 49 (1993). 
156 See generally Macey, supra note __, at 77-80. 
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recently discarded prior prudent investor standards was not uncommon.157  And 
many professionally-drafted trust instruments authorized the trustee to invade 
principal for the benefit of the income beneficiaries. 
3. Risk tolerance and the duty of care.  In the paradigmatic donative 
trust, the residual claimants are risk-averse (think widows and orphans) but the 
trend is towards trustees who are risk-neutral (this is the usual economic as-
sumption for business organizations) or at least less risk-averse than the benefi-
ciaries.158  That is, owing to the trend towards professional trustees, the typical 
modern trustee—whether a sophisticated individual such as a trust lawyer or 
an institution such as a bank—is likely to be less risk-averse than the typical 
beneficiary.  There is, after all, no well-developed market for beneficial interests 
in American trusts.159  Hence the beneficiaries can’t easily diversify, and when 
one can’t diversify the standard economic assumption is that of risk-
averseness.160  Corporate trustees, by contrast, are by definition risk-neutral (to 
repeat, this is the textbook assumption for business organizations), and individ-
ual trustees can diversify and in some cases can even insure against loss.161   
This is not to suggest that trustees are indifferent to risk or that benefi-
ciaries will never prefer aggressive portfolios of high-risk investments.  Rather 
the point concerns the relative discounts, if any, that the parties assign to ex-
pected values in the face of uncertainty. 162  The basic intuition is that the undi-
versified have a distaste for volatility, preferring instead lower expected returns 
with less risk of a substantial loss—and this even if the probability that the sub-
stantial loss will materialize is relatively small.  Thus the more risk-averse one 
is, the more likely one is to prefer a smaller but certain sum (say, $100) over a 
chance of a larger sum (say, $200) even if the larger sum ($200), when dis-
counted by its probability (say, 60%), is still larger than the smaller but certain 
sum (here $120 versus $100).   
The disparity in the trustees’ and the beneficiaries’ attitudes towards 
risk that stems from this institutional design poses a challenge for trust govern-
                                                 
157 See Getzler, supra note __, at 3-4; Gordon, supra  note __, at 75-76 & n. 99; Posner, supra note __, at § 
15.6, p. 455.  
158 The human agents of an institutional fiduciary who are assigned to manage a particular trust, how-
ever, are likely to be risk-averse.  But this is an agency problem within the institution’s organizational 
structure, and analysis of that problem is beyond the scope of this paper.  
159 See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 641 (noting an English auction in reversions and re-
mainders and remarking that no “such organized market exists in this country.”).  See also infra note 
259 and text accompanying.  
160 See Eisenhardt, supra note __, at 60-61; Varian, supra note § 12.6, p. 228.  Behavioral studies, how-
ever, are critical of this assumption.  See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang, Mental Accounting, 
Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns, 56 J. Fin. 1247, 1254 (2001). 
161 Legal malpractice insurance, for example, often includes some coverage for liability in fiduciary ad-
ministration. 
162 Clear introductory explanations can be found in Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 
50-53 (4th ed. 2003), and Varian, supra note __, at §§ 12.5-12.7, pp. 224-229. 
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ance.163  In the absence of the fiduciary obligation or other corrective mecha-
nisms trustees would often be less averse to volatility than the beneficiaries.164  
Trust law’s particular flavor of the fiduciary duty of care can be understood as 
an answer to this challenge.165  Care in trust law is the functional equivalent of 
the objective reasonable person standard in tort law.166  The trustee must “exer-
cise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing 
with his own property.”167  This duty counsels caution, and that is what undiver-
sified, risk-averse beneficiaries would prefer.  Accordingly, the commonplace that 
portfolio management by trustees in practice is overly cautious likely reflects 
some combination of too much deterrence from the duty of care and a selection 
effect in the initial choice of cautious trustees by the settlor.168 
The contrast between the duty of care in trust law and corporate law is 
instructive.169  In corporate law the business judgment rule requires deference 
to the ordinary business decisions of management unless they’re tainted by a 
conflict of interest or are so unreasonable as to amount to gross negligence.170  
This is a rather looser constraint,171 but the business judgment rule is justifiable 
                                                 
163 Agency relationships, in other words, present both incentive and risk-sharing problems.  See, e.g., 
Eisenhardt, supra note __, at 58. 
164 Commissions are often set as a percentage of the trust corpus.  See, e.g., SCPA § 2309; Langbein, 
supra note __, at 639, 651. There is, however, an emerging trend, supported by academics, towards a 
“reasonableness” standard.  See Cal. Prob. Code § 15681; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38; UTC § 
708; Halbach supra note __, at 1909.  See generally Vollmar, Hess & Whitman, supra note __, at 1059; 
Gordon, supra note __, at 82-83. 
165 An idea adverted to in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 437. 
166 See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 1 cmt.; Langbein, supra note __ at 656.  See generally Cooter & 
Freedman, supra note __, at 1057-59. 
167 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174.  See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule 
§ 227 cmt. d.  See generally Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto, eds., Breach 
of Trust 41-74 (2002). 
168 Conservatism might also stem from the rule of unanimity in trustee decisionmaking.  See Ogus, su-
pra note __, at 209-10.  This lends support to the rejection of the unanimity requirement by UTC § 703 
and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 39, as does the observation that many drafters in practice likewise 
reject the unanimity requirement.  Indeed, there has been considerable statutory activity on this issue 
as well.  See Reporter’s Notes to cmt. a of Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 39.  This is related to Steven 
Schwarcz’s suggestion that the “essential distinction between [commercial trusts and corporations] 
turns on the degree to which assets need to be placed at risk in order to satisfy the expectations of 
residual claimants.”  Schwarcz, supra note __, at 561. 
169 See Gordon, supra note __, at 94-96. 
170 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1971); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 6.4.  The 
UK has in practice, though admittedly not in name, something of a business judgment rule too.  See 
Brian Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation 313 (1997); Devlin v. Slough Estates 
Ltd. ([1983] Butterworth’s Company Law Cases 497, 504); Company Law Review Steering Group, De-
veloping the Framework (2000), ¶¶ 3.69-3.70, available online at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/ 
claw_2_3.pdf (visited May 11, 2003). 
171 Of course, one must be careful about accepting doctrinal labels as conclusive as to whether prudence 
in trust law and business judgment in corporate law beget different outcomes.  Indeed, there is ample 
authority for deferential review of trustee decis ionmaking, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
187, and the business judgment rule is not an abdication of the judicial function by the courts.  Cf. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, available online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260.  But the different emphases in the canonical statements is telling, and 
although in numerous cases courts have found a breach of the duty of care by a trustee, see, e.g., Scott 
31
Sitkoff:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003
 
An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law 
 - 29 - 
from an agency costs perspective in view of the different context in which it op-
erates.  Corporate law draws from portfolio theory a paradigmatic shareholder 
who is diversified.172  And diversified shareholders like the business judgment 
rule, because insulating managers from liability in the absence of egregious 
conduct, it helps offset the managers’ incentives—including their large invest-
ment of human capital and personal wealth in the firm—towards avoiding 
risk.173   
Trust law, in contrast, assumes that the beneficiaries are not diversified, 
so the trustee’s default duty of care is set at the more restrictive reasonable-
person threshold.  On this view the different manifestations of the duty of care 
in corporate and trust law reflect different expectations regarding internal and 
external diversification.174  In donative trusts diversification for the residual 
claimants is usually obtained internally.   
Of course, given their other holdings some beneficiaries might well be di-
versified.  For this possibility modern prudent investor standards require the 
trustee to consider the “risk tolerance” of the trust’s particular beneficiaries in 
crafting the trust portfolio.175   Trust investment strategies, in other words, 
should be a function of the beneficiaries’ attitudes towards risk.  Young scions of 
great wealth can better absorb higher volatility than elderly widows of modest 
means.  So a “trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of mod-
est means will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a 
young scion of great wealth.”176  When the trust’s beneficiaries are better diver-
sified, in other words, the trustees can (and indeed should) design a more ag-
gressive portfolio. 
                                                                                                                                          
on Trusts § 174, cases holding that a manager of a publicly traded corporation breached the duty of care 
are almost nonexistent. See Bainbridge, supra  note __, at §§ 6.2, 6.4; Allen & Kraakman, supra  note __, 
at § 8.4.2, p. 254, § 13.4, pp. 518-19. 
172 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance 120 (5th ed. 2003). 
173 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 93-102; Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder 
Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule , 77 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 179 (2001); Joy v. North , 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 & n. 6 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.); Bain-
bridge, supra note __, at § 6.3, pp. 259-63. 
174 For a complementary analysis, see Rock & Wachter, supra note __, at 652-68.  Note also that mana-
gerial decisions regarding a portfolio of liquid assets is easier to monitor than decisions regarding net 
present value of a corporation’s operating assets.  See Macey, supra note __, at 317-19.  Exogenous fac-
tors impact the results of the latter whereas the former can be compared to the performance of a hypo-
thetical prudent portfolio, thereby netting out secular market trends.  For further discussion and refer-
ences, see Sitkoff, supra note __, at __. 
175 See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227 cmt. e; Edward C. Hal-
bach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 Real Prop., Prob, & Tr. J. 407, 436-37, 
444-45 (1992). 
176 See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(b) & cmt.  See also Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor 
Rule § 227(a).  See generally Ogus, supra note __, at 196. 
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B. The Settlor/Beneficiary Tension 
In light of the agency costs considerations on both sides, this section ex-
plores four examples of how the law of private trusts balances the ex post pref-
erences of the beneficiaries with the ex ante wishes of the settlor.  To return once 
again to our exemplary trust, settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 (collec-
tively the “Bs”) with T as the trustee, the nub of the problem is that the Bs bear 
the marginal costs and benefits of T’s managerial decisions, but the ex ante 
preferences of S trump the later wishes of the Bs in guiding T’s management.177  
A variant of the well-known dead hand problem (which is perhaps a pejorative 
aphorism for the idea that the settlor’s intent controls),178 this tension has been 
exacerbated by the modern trend towards the use of the trust as a vehicle for 
asset management by professionals.  The modern managerial trust vests greater 
discretion in the hands of the trustee, and increased discretion broadens the 
range of the trustee’s hidden action.  Moreover, the ongoing erosion of the rule 
against perpetuities is expanding the temporal scope of the trustee’s discretion-
ary authority and hence the likelihood of later circumstances unanticipated by 
the settlor.179 
1. Modification and termination.  A nice example of the potential for di-
vergent interests between the settlor and the beneficiaries concerns the possibil-
ity of the beneficiaries’ seeking the premature termination of the trust.  This 
problem includes the issue of whether the beneficiaries can seek modification of 
the trust’s terms, as the power to modify is generally held to be subsumed 
within the power to terminate.180  The American rule, which originated with 
Claflin v. Claflin,181 may be summed up as unfriendly.  Under the Claflin doc-
trine, a trust may be terminated prematurely with the settlor’s consent or, in 
the absence of the settlor’s consent, only if the termination would not frustrate a 
                                                 
177 See Ogus, supra note __, at 214. 
178 See generally Alexander, supra note __, at 1254-64; Hirsch & William, supra note __; Ronald Ches-
ter, Inheritance, Wealth and Society  passim (1982); Posner, supra  note __, at § 18.3, pp. 518-20; Gareth 
H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed., Death, Taxes and 
Family Property 119 (1977). 
179 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, et. al., Family Property Law  900 (3d ed. 2002).  See also Sterk, RAP, 
supra, note __; Note, Dynasty Trusts, supra note __; Dobris, supra note __; Vallario, supra note __; Jesse 
Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts:  Sheltering Descendants from Transfer Taxes, 23 Est. Plan. 417 (1996).  
An interesting question is whether private trusts might soon face the sort of dead-hand problems that 
are familiar in charitable trusts as the latter have long been exempt from the rule against perpetuities.  
See generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts:  Expanding the 
Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 353, 356 (1999); Posner, supra note __, at § 18.4, p. 
520; Macey, supra note __. 
180 Cf. II Scott on Trusts § 107.3, p. 125.  Note, however, that the relevant considerations for modifica-
tion versus termination are not entirely the same.  See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 cmt. f.  This 
follows from, among other things, the observation that in practice termination often pits the current 
against the remainder beneficiaries whereas modification more commonly touches only the 
settlor/beneficiary tension.   
181 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).  See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65  cmt. a. 
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“material purpose” of the trust.182  Settlor’s consent, however, is by definition 
unavailable for the modification of a testamentary trust, and anyway courts 
have had little difficulty in finding a “material purpose” that would be offended 
by a modification or termination.183  So as a practical matter, unless the trustee 
consents,184 American trusts are difficult to amend or terminate once estab-
lished.  Indeed, even if all the competent beneficiaries and the  trustee were in-
clined to strike a deal, the frequency of unidentified or minor beneficiaries re-
duces the viability of this alternative.185 
The upshot of the Claflin doctrine is that it helps align the interests of 
the settlor and the trustee.  The rule allows the trustee to preserve the settlor’s 
original design, regardless of wishes of the beneficiaries, which in the usual case 
is what the settlor would have wanted.  The settlor, after all, chose a trust 
rather than another form of organization or an outright transfer,186  so the 
Claflin doctrine is consistent with the model of the settlor as the primary princi-
pal.  Moreover, even though a particular beneficiary might prefer the power to 
cause the termination of the trust if asked ex post, in the aggregate potential 
beneficiaries may do better ex ante with the Claflin doctrine.  The assurance 
provided by the Claflin doctrine (i.e., the reduction in settlor/trustee agency 
costs that it facilitates) should increase the willingness of grantors to create a 
trust in the first place.187  The justification appears to be that beneficiaries as a 
class do better with more trusts (and so more gifting188), albeit with potentially 
greater managerial agency costs, than with fewer trusts with a reduced poten-
tial for managerial agency costs. 
On the other hand, the downside of the rule is that it entrenches the 
trustee and locks in a certain minimal level of beneficiary/trustee agency costs.  
Under the classic American approach, even if all of the beneficiaries are identi-
fiable adults who would be better off if the trust were terminated (perhaps be-
                                                 
182 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 & cmt. a; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 337; IV Scott on 
Trusts §§ 337-340.2. 
183 See generally IV Scott on Trusts §§ 337.1-337.8.  For a specific example, see In re Estate of Brown, 
528 A.2d 752, 755 (Vt. 1987) (“We believe that the settlor’s intention to assure a life-long income to 
Woolson and Rosemary Brown would be defeated if termination were allowed.”). 
184 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 342; IV Scott on Trusts § 342, pp. 529-32; Roger W. Andersen, 
Understanding Trusts and Estates 110-111 (3d ed. 2003). 
185 Cf. IV Scott on Trusts § 342, p. 532.   
186 Cf. Langbein, supra note __, at  632 (“The donor who structures a gift in this way expects compensat-
ing advantages.”). 
187 That the trust is less easily modified than a contract might help solve the so-called Samaritan’s di-
lemma, see Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms  __ (2000), by binding all to the ex ante deal.  See Ogus, 
supra  note __, at 189.  The idea is that if S is willing to transfer resources to B but B anticipates that S 
will do so, then B will behave more recklessly because he know that S will be providing a safety net. 
188 The further assumption here is that the overall volume of gifting would fall because in the absence of 
these rules some grantors would prefer not to make a transfer at all.  If the level of overall gifting re-
mained constant, however, then beneficiaries might do better without the rule, provided that the alter-
native modes of transfer imposed fewer restrictions.  But with fewer restrictions, these alternatives 
would be imperfect substitutes, so it is unlikely that the overall level of gifting would remain constant. 
34
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 13 [2003]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art13
 
An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law 
 - 32 - 
cause its consequent administrative expenses would be eliminated), the trustee 
need not assent to their wishes.  Against the Claflin doctrine, therefore, it might 
be argued that the fundamental decision whether or not to continue the trust is 
not in the hands of those who bear the marginal costs and benefits of that deci-
sion.   
True, at its most extreme this is just to say that the beneficiaries cannot 
override the settlor’s choice of form; and the American rule appears to represent 
the judgment that all the relevant parties do better in the aggregate by allowing 
settlors to bind the residual claimants to the trust form of organization.  But if 
one starts from the premise that ultimately settlors of today’s managerial trusts 
would want to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries, then it might well be 
that a different rule is preferable, especially in view of the ongoing erosion of the 
rule against perpetuities.189  On this view, one-time settlors don’t know to opt 
out of the default Claflin regime and their advisors are failing to call this to 
their attention (the latter being a manifestation of a different agency problem).   
Thus, it should not be a surprise that there is a strong academic and 
slowly emerging decisional trend towards liberalizing these rules.190  As in the 
classic (if then extraordinary) Pulitzer case, courts are beginning to show a will-
ingness to authorize deviation from the settlor’s administrative or other instruc-
tions that, over time, are shown to conflict with the settlor’s assumed larger aim 
of benefiting the beneficiaries.191  Certainly the new Uniform Trust Code and the 
new Third Restatement of Trusts embrace this view,192 and in fact they extend it 
to the power of “equitable deviation.”  The idea behind equitable deviation is 
that courts should permit modification of even the dispositive instructions of the 
trust instrument in view of changed circumstances not anticipated by the 
settlor.193  Related, there is burgeoning authority,  perfectly sensible from an 
                                                 
189 See supra note 179 and text accompanying. 
190 See, e.g., Halbach, supra note __, at 1899-1901; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends in the 
Trust Law of the United States, 32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 531, 538 (1999); Cal. Prob. Code § 15409.  See also 
Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century:  The Uniform Trust Code 
Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 697 (2001); Gail Boreman Bird, Trust Termin a-
tion:  Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands—Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie , 36 Hastings L. J. 564 
(1985). 
191 Matter of Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App. Div. 1932).  See 
e.g., Carnahan v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio App. 1998); In re Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 
1960); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 Reporter’s Notes to cmt. b (collecting illustrative authority).  
For further discussion of Pulitzer, see Langbein, manuscript supra note __, at 22-24. 
192 See UTC §§ 410-12; Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 65-66; David M. English, The Uniform Trust 
Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 143, 169-176 (2002); Chester, su-
pra note __, at 724-28; Julia C. Walker, Note, Get Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries’ Right to 
Terminate or Modify a Trust Under the Uniform Trust Code , 67 Mo. L. Rev. 443 (2002); English, supra 
note __, at 27-28.   
193 See Halbach, supra  note __, at 1900-01; UTC § 412; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66.  Cf. Peter J. 
Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal of the Claflin  Doctrine—New View of the Po licy Against Perpetuities?,  
50 Mo. L. Rev. 805 (1985); Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law 
of Trusts, 18 Hastings LJ. 267, 294 (1967); N.Y. Est. Pow. & Tr. L. § 7-1.6(b).   
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agency-costs contractarian perspective, for trust modifications made desirable 
by tax exigencies that arise after the trust has been settled.194   
Note, however, that all of these liberalizations are designed to advance 
the settlors’ probable intent.195  If at the time of the trust’s creation a particular 
tax savings was not possible, the reasonable assumption is that the settlor 
would want the trust later modified to minimize taxes in light of subsequent 
changes to the tax law.196  Similarly, the average settlor would want the court to 
modify even the distributive provisions of the trust if, thanks to unanticipated 
circumstances, the settlor’s prior regime is no longer sensible.197  To return to 
our exemplary trust, settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2, the supposition is 
that S would have preferred to favor B2 over B1 if subsequently the former was 
disabled in an accident while the business of the latter proved unusually suc-
cessful.198  So all of these liberalizations, if understood as designed to effect a 
substituted judgment for what the settlor would have wanted, are consistent 
with a model of the trust in which the settlor is the primary principal.  These 
liberalizing trends give the beneficiaries what they want, but only when doing 
so would approximate what the settlor would have wanted.  They add the nu-
ance of standards, as it were, to the otherwise blunderbuss Claflin rule. 
The more liberal English approach, in contrast, reflects a rather different 
dead-hand calculus.  To begin with, the leading English case on the question of 
premature termination, Saunders v. Vautier,199 reaches the opposite result from 
Claflin.200  Thus the answer in England to the question of whether all the 
beneficiaries, if they are identifiable adults, can force the premature 
termination of a trust over the dissent of the trustee is yes.201  Indeed, owing not 
only to Saunders but even more clearly to the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,202                                                  
194 See Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 12.2 & Reporter’s Note 
(stating the rule and collecting authority); UTC § 416; IIA Scott on Trusts § 167, p. 281 n. 27 & 2001 
Supplement at 306-11  (collecting authority); Halbach, supra note __, at 1887.  Cf. Mary Louise Fellows, 
In Search of Donative Intent, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 611 (1988).   
195 See Langbein, supra  note __, at 68-69. 
196 The qualification allows for the scenario in which the settlor opts for a less tax-efficient trust in order 
to maintain more control, for example the use of a nonexempt generation-skipping trust. 
197 These liberalizations are therefore importantly different from reformation (which the English call 
rectification of documents in equity).  See generally Langbein, supra  note __, at 69.  Reformation con-
forms the document to what was actually intended at the time of execution.  The innovation here is the 
extension of the concept to testamentary trusts.  See Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers § 12.1; UTC § 415.  See, e.g., Pond v. Pond, 678 N.E.2d 1321 (Mass. 1997).   
198 For an example of the traditional, contrary approach, see In re Trust of Stuchell, 801 P.2d 852 (Or. 
1990) (refusing to modify a trust so as to preserve a di sabled beneficiary’s eligibility for public assis-
tance on the ground that the modification’s “only purpose . . . [was] to make the trust more advanta-
geous to the beneficiaries”).  But see Macey, surpa  note __, at 300-02 (defending narrower interpreta-
tions of settlor’s intent). 
199 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841).  See also Goulding v. James, [1997] 2 All ER 239, 247 (“The principle recon-
ises the rights of beneficiaries, who are sui juris and together entitled to the trust property, to exercise 
their proprietary rights to over bear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor to subject property 
to the continuing trusts, powers and limitations of a will or trust instrument.”). 
200 For a historical discussion, see Alexander, supra note __, at 1200-04. 
201 See D.J. Hayton, The Law of Trusts 93-96 (3d ed. 1998); Moffat, supra  note __, at 248-52.  
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ders but even more clearly to the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,202 English law 
resolves significantly more of the settlor/beneficiary tension on questions of 
trust modification in favor of the beneficiaries.203  Unlike the recent liberaliza-
tions to American trust law, in England the question of what the settlor would 
have wanted has little bearing on the resolution of these questions.204   
In the English trust, therefore, the settlor is not the primary principal 
and the settlor’s interests are subordinated to the goal of minimizing manage-
rial agency costs ex post.  “[A]fter the settlor’s death, the trust is regarded as the 
beneficiaries’ property, not the settlor’s property—and the dead hand continues 
to rule only by the sufferance of the beneficiaries.”205  A powerful criticism of this 
approach, at least since the 1958 Act, is that it is mandatory.  English settlors 
cannot opt for the American or any other more restrictive approach.  The Claflin 
doctrine, however, is default, so American settlors can choose instead the Eng-
lish or any other more permissive regime.  Put differently, an American trust 
can be made to resemble an English one but English trusts cannot be made to 
resemble an American one. 
2. Trustee removal.  A second and more specific example of the potential 
tension between the interests of the settlor and the interests of the beneficiaries 
concerns the question of on what grounds the beneficiaries may obtain the re-
moval of the trustee.  Yet again to return to our exemplary trust, settled by S for 
the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the question is when if ever can B1 
and/or B2 replace T. 
On the one hand, settlors select trustees among other reasons because of 
the trustees’ expected fidelity to the wishes of the settlor in the future exercise of 
discretion.  On the other hand, it is the beneficiaries who as residual claimants 
bear the marginal costs and benefits of the trustee’s decisions.  Hence the bene-
ficiaries have an incentive to monitor the performance of the trustee, and any-
way under standard doctrine only the beneficiaries have standing to bring an 
action against the trustee for breach of trust.206  The difficulty, then, is setting 
the threshold for removal of the trustee high enough so that the trustee has 
room to carry out the settlors’ wishes (including the protection of future benefi-
ciaries) in the teeth of a contrary preference of the current beneficiaries without 
                                                 
202 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1.  Well-drafted instruments can easily circumvent Saunders, for example by 
ensuring the existence of contingent interests.  The 1958 Act, however, is indeed mandatory and it al-
lows for the variation ex post of even discretionary trusts.  For general discussion and references, see 
Moffat, supra note __, at 253-72. 
203 See Ogus, supra note __, at 202-04; Hayton, supra note __, at 174; Moffat, supra note __, at 248-73; 
Pearce & Stevens, supra note __, at 423-38; Hayton, supra note __, at 598-600; Jones, supra note __, at 
124-26.  See generally Chester, supra  note __, at 709-22.  Canada is similarly more liberal.  See Keith B. 
Farquhar, Recent Themes in the Variation of Trusts, 20 Est. Tr. & Pens. J. 181 (2001). 
204 See Farquhar, supra note __, at 186-91; Moffat, supra note __, at 248-86.  See also Wiedenbeck, supra 
note __; Ogus, supra note __, at 202. 
205 Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 651.  See also Jones, supra note __, at 119-20. 
206 See infra Part III.C.3. 
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setting it so high as in effect to sanction shirking or mismanagement.  In other 
words, the goal is to minimize trustee/beneficiary agency costs subject to the ex 
ante constraints imposed by the settlor. 
The law’s default approach is to authorize courts to sack trustees who are 
shown generally to be dishonest or who are shown specifically to have engaged 
in a “serious breach of trust,” but not necessarily to remove trustees for breaches 
that are not “serious” or to remove trustees for mere “friction.”207  Trustees who 
were chosen by the settlor as compared to those named by a third party or a 
court are even less readily removed—there is something of a thumb on the scale 
for them.208  Thus, if the settlor was aware of an asserted ground for removal at 
the time of naming the trustee, that ground will not serve as a basis for the later 
removal of the trustee unless the trustee is “entirely” unfit to serve.209   
These default rules appear to reflect the bargain to which the settlor and 
trustee would have agreed when trusts were used predominately for the preser-
vation of family land and the typical trustee was an amateur rather than a fee-
paid professional.  When the trustee’s mission was simply to hold onto ancestral 
land, there were fewer opportunities for beneficiary/trustee conflict (with less to 
do, shirking is less of a problem).  And in the aggregate, beneficiaries do better 
when settlors are comfortable establishing trusts if the alternative is that 
settlors wouldn’t make the transfer at all.  So the traditionally high threshold 
for sacking a trustee serviced the interests of the settlor while imposing a toler-
able level of agency costs on the beneficiaries. 
Today, however, modern prudent investor standards allow for greater dis-
cretion in portfolio management and the default overarching aim is to maximize 
total return.  This is related to the apparent trend towards professional trustees 
(which suggests a weakened personal link between the settlor and the trus-
tee);210 it is a component of the larger trend towards the use of the trust as an 
organizing device for the professional management of financial assets; and with 
these changes trust fiduciary law has replaced limited powers as the chief pro-
tection for beneficiaries.211  All of this is to say that, in view of the rise of the 
modern managerial trust, the potential for agency costs in the 
trustee/beneficiary relationship has increased.  Thus, the importance of removal 
as a check on these agency costs has likewise increased. 
                                                 
207 See, e.g., II Scott on Trusts at § 107, pp. 108-09; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmts. b-c; 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. e(1). 
208 See, e.g., II Scott on Trusts at § 107.1, pp. 117-18; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. f; 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f.  Cf. English, supra note __, at 197-199 (discussing situations 
“where the personal link between the settlor and trustee has been broken”). 
209 See, e.g., II Scott on Trusts at § 107.1, p. 118; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. g; Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f. 
210 See note 55 and text accompanying. 
211 See generally Langbein, supra  note __, at 638-43; Langbe in, supra note __, at 71.  See also Alexan-
der, supra note __, at 775-76; Jones, supra note __, at 121-23. 
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Consistent with this analysis, anecdotal evidence suggests that settlors 
today regularly contract out of the default removal rules in favor of easier sub-
stitution of trustees,212 sometimes even authorizing a third-party (so-called trust 
“protectors,” who will be discussed later) to exercise the power to replace a trus-
tee.213  Consider also the analogy to the robust econometric evidence regarding 
the negative impact on shareholder welfare of corporate takeover defenses such 
as classified boards.214  This, too, lends support to the view that reducing the 
threshold for the removal of trustees should improve beneficiary welfare (put-
ting to the side the effect of deterring the settling of trusts in the first place).   
The foregoing is therefore an argument in favor of the somewhat more 
liberal removal standards embraced by the new Uniform Trust Code and Re-
statement (Third) of Trusts.215  The argument is particularly strong with respect 
to removal of large (as compared to boutique) institutional fiduciaries.216  Unlike 
an individual with whom the settlor might have had a personal link, one institu-
tional fiduciary is unlikely to have a comparative advantage over another in ef-
fecting the settlor’s intent, especially after a corporate reorganization and/or 
turnover in the company’s staff of account managers.217  Of course, this is not to 
suggest that reputational concerns, especially for large banks and trust compa-
nies, won’t militate towards fidelity.  Rather the point is that making it easier 
(at least as a default matter) for the beneficiaries to substitute one institution 
for another might help create an ex post competition between institutional fidu-
ciaries for trust control, as it were, to go along with the current ex ante competi-
tion for selection by the settlor.218   
                                                 
212 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34 cmt. c (“It is also common for the terms of trusts to pro-
vide for the appointment of new trustees.”); John R. Price, Price on Contemporary Estate Planning  § 
10.41, p. 1152 (2d ed. 2000); American Jurisprudence, Legal Forms—Trusts §§ 251:370–251:373, 
251:388 (2d ed. 2001); Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners, Standard Provisions § 13 (1997).  This 
discussion puts to one side the doctrinal question of when this might cause the trustee to be deemed an 
agent, legally defined, of the beneficiaries, thereby triggering consequences that the settlor probably 
would not have intended.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 14, cmt. c, 14B, cmt. c. 
213 See infra Part IV.B.4. 
214 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitake-
over Force of Staggered Boards:  Theory, Evidence, and Po licy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002); Robert  
Daines, Do Classified Boards Affect Firm Value?  Takeover Defenses After the Poison Pill (manuscript 
on file with the author). 
215 See UTC § 706; English, supra note __, at 197-99; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 & cmt. e; Lang-
bein, supra note __, at 75-76 (noting that the UTC “responds to the concern that under traditional law 
beneficiaries have had little recourse when trustee performance has been indifferent, but not so egre-
gious as to be in breach of trust”); English, supra note __, at 28. 
216 See Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust 
Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lens Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiaries?, 67 Mo. 
L. Rev. 241, 253-56 (2002).   
217 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f (“[D]eference . . . may no longer be justified if, after 
being designated, a corporate trustee undergoes a significant structural change, such as by merger.”); 
Chester & Ziomek, supra note __.  See also Price, supra note __, at § 10.43.1, p. 1161-62. 
218 Cf. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 661.  It should be noted, however, that a cost of this 
approach is further burdening the fiduciary apparatus that protects future beneficiaries from excessive 
favoring of the current beneficiaries.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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3. Settlor standing.  A further example of the settlor/beneficiary tension 
is the question of settlor standing to enforce the terms of the trust.  The tradi-
tional rule is that in an irrevocable trust only the beneficiaries have standing to 
bring an action for breach of trust.219  On first glance this follows naturally from 
the position of the beneficiaries as the residual claimants, and it mirrors the 
similar approach in other organizational forms, most obviously the corpora-
tion.220  Once the trust has been established, the settlor, like anyone else who is 
not a beneficiary, has no tangible stake in enforcing its terms.  The beneficiar-
ies, in contrast, bear the marginal costs and benefits of the trustees’ decision 
making.  So it is the beneficiaries who have an incentive to bring litigation only 
when cost-justified, at least so far as they are identified and their stake is large 
enough to counter the collective action problem.221   
But this analysis is too simple.  Indeed, against this Langbein suggests 
that most settlors would prefer to retain the ability to bring enforcement actions 
against the trustee.  Thus Langbein argues that the underlying default rule 
should be reversed so that it would imply settlor standing in the absence of a 
contrary instruction in the trust instrument.222  There are, however, two addi-
tional relevant considerations, the second of which is more clearly brought into 
view by the agency-costs approach and its nexus of contracts analogy. 
First, because of an exogenous tax consideration, this is a que stion on 
which evidence of the actual bargains struck by settlors is not necessarily in-
dicative of their preferences.  Under current doctrine, in order to have standing 
to sue, the settlor must retain some sort of beneficial interest in the trust.223  
But doing so would likely subject the trust to undesirable tax consequences.224  
This means that the general failure by settlors to retain standing rights is not 
good evidence of their preferences.  More concretely, this failure is not good evi-
                                                 
219 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200; III Scott on Trusts §§ 200-200.1, pp. 207-12.  See generally 
John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts:  Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N. C. L. 
Rev. 905 (1984); Note, Right of a Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1370 (1949). 
220 See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders 
the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23 (1991); Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note __, at 37-38; Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 9.2, pp. 410-17.  In both corporate and 
trust litigation any recovery from the fiduciary will be owed either to the plaintiff or to the 
trust/corporation depending on the nature of the breach. 
221 See Gordon, supra note __, at 76-79. 
222 Langbein, supra note __, at 664-65.  See also Hayton, supra  note __, at 103.  A similar analysis 
might apply to the question of whether the settlor of an inter vivos trust has the power to revoke or to 
amend the trust in the absence of express authority in the trust instrument to do so.  See Halbach, su-
pra note __, at 1898-99; UTC § 602; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63; Langbein, supra note __, at 70-
71.  There is also overlap with the question of standing under the Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act (“UMIFA”), see, e.g., Yale University v. Blumentahl, 621 A.2d 1304 (1993), which is currently 
being revised. 
223 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200 cmt. b; III Scott on Trusts § 200.1, p. 212. 
224 See generally George T. Bogert, Trusts § 145, p. 516 (6th ed. 1987).  In correspondence with the au-
thor, Joel Dobris helpfully suggested that another way to look at the question is to ask whether a nar-
rowly crafted power to enforce state law fiduciary duties would qualify as a string under IRC §§ 2036 
and 2038.   
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dence that the increased trustee commissions that such standing would prompt 
has deterred settlors from retaining a beneficial interest.  The proliferation of 
the trust “protector,” which will be discussed below, is in fact evidence to the 
contrary. 
Second, the agency cost implications of the recognition of settlor standing 
are not as obvious as suggested at the outset of this subsection.  True, it is pos-
sible that settlor standing would increase agency costs by introducing a second 
master, as it were, over the trustee.  “A manager told to serve two masters . . . 
has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”225  This is the usual argu-
ment in the corporate law discourse against allowing managers to justify their 
decisions by reference to the welfare of any constituency other than sharehold-
ers.226  And this objection might have particular salience in the trust context, 
because the fear of litigation on these alternate fronts might further inhibit al-
ready overly cautious trustees.  After all, an important rationale for the recent 
changes to the standards of prudent investing was to encourage trustees to be 
less conservative.227 
On the other hand, the donative settlor’s motivation for interposing a 
trustee between the trust assets and the beneficiary, tax exigencies to one side, 
is often a lack of faith in the beneficiaries’ judgment.  Given the likelihood of 
feckless, unborn, minor, unidentifiable, or otherwise incompetent beneficiar-
ies,228 and further given the possibility of a free-rider problem among the benefi-
ciaries,229 settlor standing might minimize agency costs by making more viable 
the threat of litigation as a deterrent against actions by the trustee that are not 
in the best interests of the beneficiaries or are but breach a contrary instruction 
of the settlor.  Many trust beneficiaries, as has been noted elsewhere, are not 
particularly effective monitors,230 and even when they are, their preferences are 
not necessarily congruent with the settlor’s. 
The further contribution of the foregoing agency costs analysis to Lang-
bein’s discussion is to highlight the importance of the questions of whose claim 
the settlor would be permitted to advance and whether the settlor’s approval of 
an action would insulate the trustee from a later action by the beneficiaries (or 
                                                 
225 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra  note __, at 38. 
226 See, e.g., Macey, supra  note __, at 31-36; Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 9.2, pp. 414-18. 
227 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note __; Halbach, supra note __. 
228 The doctrine of virtual representation and the appointment of a guardian ad litem are at best partial 
solutions.  Guardians ad litem are often highly inflexible, see, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, 
Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1379 n. 1 (Fla. 1993); see also UPC § 1-403; UTC § 305; Martin 
D. Beglieter, The Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 Willamette L. Rev. 643 (1984), and the 
doctrine of virtual representation requires an alignment of interests across generations.  See, e.g., UPC 
1-403; N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 315; UTC § 304; In re Wolcott , 56 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1948); Lawrence B. 
Rodman & Leroy E. Rodman, Virtual Representation: Some Possible Extensions, 6 Real Prop. Prob. & 
Tr. J. 281 (1971).  See generally Valerie J. Vollmar, Amy Morris Hess, & Robert Whitman, An Introduc-
tion to Trusts and Estates 345-46 (2003). 
229 See infra Part IV.D.1. 
230 See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note __, at 1114-15, 1118-19; Gordon, supra  note __, at 82. 
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the beneficiaries’ guardian ad litem).231  This question is a specific manifestation 
of the larger issue of determining who is the trustee’s dominant principal, the 
settlor or the beneficiaries.  If the aim of trust law were to maximize the welfare 
of the beneficiaries, without more, then settlor standing should be qualified so 
as to require that any claim brought by the settlor be resolved from the perspec-
tive of the beneficiaries.  But our model of the trust is one in which the trustee is 
to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries subject to the initial constraints of 
the settlor.  Thus, the recognition of settlor standing could reduce two very dif-
ferent types of agency costs.   
First, again returning to our exemplary trust settled by S for the benefit 
of B1 and B2, T is more likely to act appropriately if not only B1 and B2 have 
standing to sue, but so did S.  Here S’s standing would provide a backstop check 
on managerial agency costs.  Second, T is less likely to enter into a side bargain 
with the Bs to avoid the ex ante constraints imposed by S if S had standing to 
sue.  For example, the Bs might otherwise offer to pay T to disburse the corpus 
of the trust, and there would be no duty of loyalty problem if all the Bs were 
competent adults who signed on to the deal.232  In this scenario S’s standing  
would help ensure that T respects S’s limitations on the use of the trust’s funds.   
Given the lack of identifiable beneficiaries in charitable trusts, the fore-
going analysis may be relevant to the ongoing debate over settlor standing in 
that context as well.233   
4. Trust protectors.  An emerging feature of modern managerial trusts is 
the appointment of a so-called trust “protector.”234  To return yet again to our 
exemplary trust, which was settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as 
the trustee, S might also name his trusted friend P as the trust “protector,” fre-
quently an uncompensated position.  Among other things P might be granted 
the authority to replace T, to approve modifications to the trust in view of deve l-
opments in the tax law or changes in the Bs’ welfare, and otherwise to make the 
sort of decisions with respect to the trust’s management that S would have made 
                                                 
231 For a complementary doctrin al analysis, see Hayton, supra note __, at 103-04. 
232 See supra notes 184-185 and text accompanying. 
233 See UTC § 405(c); Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 
405(C) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law:  How Important is it and How Extensive Should it 
be?, 37 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 611, 628-29 (2003); English, supra note __, at 180; Paula Kilcoyne, Do-
nor Standing Under the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act in Light of Carl J. Herzog 
Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 21 West. N. Eng. L. Rev. 131 (1999).  See also Geoffrey A. 
Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 Wisc. L. Rev. 227; Sympo-
sium Issue on the Bishop Estate Controversy, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 353-714 (1999); Henry B. Hans-
mann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law , 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 606-15 (1981); UTC § 405 & cmt.; 
Ilana H. Eisenstein, Note, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the 
Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1747 (2003). 
234 See Reporter’s Notes to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 64 cmts. b-d ; Hayton, supra  note __, at 579.  
See also SD ST § 55-1B-1(2); UTC § 808(c) & cmt. 
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had S been able to do so.235  Originally conceived as a check on local trustees in 
offshore asset-protection trusts—not surprisingly, offshore jurisdictions typically 
require the appointment of a local trustee and anyway doing so is critical to 
avoiding in rem jurisdiction by mainland courts236—the trust protector has to-
day migrated into ordinary trusts.  This migration is unsurprising in light of the 
protector’s usefulness in minimizing agency costs.   
Putting to one side the doctrinal question of when, if ever, protectors 
should be held to be fiduciaries with respect to the beneficiaries,237 the ability of 
the protector to check agency costs is relatively straightforward.  An office of 
trust protector allows the settlor to appoint a trusted friend or confidant to 
monitor the trustee’s management.  Thus, for all the reasons noted in the prior 
subsection that settlor standing might reduce agency costs, the appointment of a 
trust protector might similarly reduce agency costs.  But it has the further ad-
vantages of avoiding the tax consequences of settlor standing and it continues to 
function even after the settlor’s death.  
True, such an appointment opens the door to new sources of agency 
costs—the settlor/protector relationship as well as the beneficiaries/protector 
relationship.  But these costs are likely to be swamped by the reduction in 
agency costs overall.  By giving the protector authority, say, to replace the trus-
tee, but not appointing the protector to be the trustee, the settlor is freed to ap-
point a trusted and loyal friend as the trust protector even if this friend other-
wise lacks the administrative or portfolio management skills necessary himself 
to be a good trustee or co-trustee.238  Moreover, by giving the protector the power 
to select his or her successor, the office of the protector will continue to be occu-
pied despite the erosion of the rule against perpetuities and the emergence of so-
called perpetual trusts.   
The more general point is that the emergence of trust protectors is a re-
sponse to the settlor’s uncertainty about the future.  Like powers of appoint-
ment,239 a trust protector can be used to build flexibility into a trust.   
                                                 
235 See, e.g., SD ST § 55-1B-6 (2002) (listing potential powers); Hayton, supra  note __, at 583-84 (same).  
See generally Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in A. J. Oakley, ed., 
Trends in Contemporary Trust Law  63 (1963); Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl, Part I, 4 J. 
Int’l Tr. & Corp. Plan. 131 (1995); Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl, Part II,  5 J. Int’l Tr. & 
Corp. Plan. 18 (1996); Paul Matthews, Protectors: Two Cases, Twenty Questions, 9 Tr. L. Int’l 108 
(1995).  See also Halbach, supra note __, at 1916-17. 
236 See Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note __. 
237 On this question, which is beyond the scope of this paper, see, e.g., Reporter’s Notes to Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 64 cmts. b-d (T.D. No. 3, approved 2001); Waters, supra note __. 
238 The evolution of the protector might thus be understood as falling within the framework of Lang-
bein’s predicted “fractionation of trusteeship.” Langbein, supra note __, at 665-66.   
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C. Internal Governance and External Authority 
By including creditors within its scope, the agency costs model of the 
trust as an organizational form helpfully highlights the interrelationship be-
tween internal governance and the scope of the authority of “insiders” to trans-
act with “outsiders.”  The key point is that the  agency cost considerations rele-
vant to the substantive content of the rules of internal trust governance are a 
function of the scope of the external relations authority of the principal parties 
to deal with outsiders; and similarly the extent to which the insiders to the trust 
deal might safely be granted authority to transact over trust assets with outsid-
ers is a function of the effectiveness of the internal governance structure.240   
Hence, the agency costs approach to the trust advanced in this paper 
should not be taken as an embrace of the sort of contractarian nihilism that 
leads to the conclusion that organizations have no boundaries—in Jensen and 
Meckling’s words, that “it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those 
things that are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from those things 
that are ‘outside’ of it.”241  To the contrary, the point recognizes the existence of 
boundaries and the crucial asset partitioning role of organizational law (i.e., the 
de facto separate legal  entity of the trust or its equivalent, the trustee as trus-
tee).  The claim is rather that the rules which govern the relations of the trust’s 
“insiders” with “outsiders”—what Hansmann and Mattei refer to as trust law’s 
“essential” asset partitioning function—are intertwined with the governance 
mechanisms available to the insiders for regulating the external relations of 
each other.  So the claim of this section is that the rules of governance are inter-
twined with the rules of external relations.  Any change in one will have a ripple 
effect on the terms to which the relevant parties would have agreed concerning 
the other.  Accordingly, agency costs analysis of trust law speaks not only to 
matters of both internal governance and external relations, but it also brings 
into view the interrelationship between the two.  
1. Equitable tracing.  Perhaps the best example of this point is the prin-
ciple of equitable tracing.  Under standard doctrine, beneficiaries have the right 
to assert an equitable lien on property transferred by the trustee to a third-
party in breach of trust, provided the transferee is not a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice.242  Fraudulent conveyance law to one side, one’s recourse 
for a broken contract does not normally include a suit against the outsider who 
benefited by the breach.243  So there is some tension here with notion of the trust 
                                                 
240 Thus, just as one would not study the rules of an agent’s (legally defined) authority to bind the prin-
cipal without reference to the effectiveness of the governance devices provided by the law of agency (and 
vice versa), so too the rules of the external relations of the principal parties with respect to the trust 
property are related to the rules of internal trust governance (and vice versa).   
241 Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 56-57. 
242 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 283-295; IV Scott on Trusts §§ 283-95; Kline v. Orebaugh, 519 
P.2d 691, 696 (Kan. 1974). 
243 This is an important premise for the notion of efficient breach.  See, e.g., Posner, supra note __, at § 
4.9, pp. 120-21.  But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at S412-13. 
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as a third-party beneficiary contract.  Langbein’s answer, in addition to conclud-
ing that the trust is in the end a hybrid of contract and property,244 is to charac-
terize the rule as embodying “a judgment about how far to impinge on outsiders 
to the trust deal between the settlor and trustee in order to vindicate that 
deal.”245   
There is, in contrast, no tension between this point and the agency costs 
model of the trust as an organizational form.  By including those who deal with 
the trustee within the relevant set or nexus of relationships, the rule of equita-
ble tracing can be understood as reflecting the parties’ presumed intent in light 
of the comparative advantage of the outsider over the beneficiary to bear the 
agency costs associated with this particular potential breach by the trustee.  
Thus, even though Hansmann & Mattei regard the default rules of internal 
trust governance as “relatively unimportant” in comparison to the rules that 
control the relations of the principle parties with outsiders,246 their explanation 
of equitable tracing likewise acknowledges the interrelationship between exter-
nal relations and internal governance.  When “the rule [of equitable tracing] op-
erates, the third party transferor is almost by definition a lower-cost monitor of 
the [trustee’s] breach of duty than is the [beneficiary].”247  In other words, in the 
absence of a contrary agreement, efficiency militates towards allocating this risk 
to the outsider rather than increasing the burden on the trust’s internal govern-
ance devices.  The outsider is the cheaper bearer of this risk.248   
This sort of analysis not only provides a functional explanation for equi-
table tracing as a positive matter, but it also helps bring into view pertinent 
normative considerations for modern trust law reform.  Recognition of the inter-
relationship between internal governance and the scope of external relations 
authority shows that the “price” for relaxing one is increasing the problems as-
sociated with the other.  Thus, recognition of the tradeoff provides a straight-
forward means for ascertaining the costs and benefits of law reform on the mar-
gins of this question. 
A concrete example is the trend towards liberalizing the rules that gov-
ern the dealings of the trustee, as trustee, with third parties.249  The foregoing 
analysis suggests that the price, as it were, for enlarging the trustee’s transac-
tional authority will be an increase in potential agency costs and so a greater 
burden on the internal governance devices.  Hence, when David English, the 
Uniform Trust Code’s Reporter, suggests that “beneficiaries are helped more by 
                                                 
244 See supra note 42 and text accompanying. 
245 Langbein, supra note __, at 647-48.  See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at S378-79. 
246 Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 438.  See supra note __ and text accompanying. 
247 Id. at 464. 
248 Cf. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:  
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (1977). 
249 UTC §§ 1010-13.  These UTC provisions, which are based on similar provisions in the 1969 Uniform 
Probate Code and Uniform Trustee Powers Act, are the culmination of a decades-long process of statu-
tory reform.  See supra note 11. 
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the free flow of commerce than they were by the largely ineffective protective 
features of former law,”250 he might be interpreted as suggesting that increasing 
the value of property held in the trust’s default form by expanding the trustees’ 
transactional opportunities (the benefit of this reform) outweighs the minimal 
increase in the burden on the existing governance devices (the cost of this re-
form).251 
2. The spendthrift trust.  A second example of the importance of the in-
terrelationship between internal governance considerations and the scope of the 
principal parties’ external relations authority may be found in the spendthrift 
trust.  Spendthrift trusts, in comparison to ordinary trusts without spendthrift 
protection, shield the trusts’ assets from the beneficiaries’ creditors.252  This is 
true even if the trust instrument requires mandatory payouts, because those 
payments could be made directly to the beneficiaries’ service providers.253  Not 
surprisingly, there is a substantial literature on the policy soundness of the 
spendthrift trust.254  There is also considerable divergence among the common 
law nations on their enforcement.  Spendthrift provisions are valid in the 
United States (indeed, they are the default in New York255), but they are not en-
forced in the majority of the common law world (including most prominently 
England).256   
The existing normative commentary on the spendthrift trust tends to 
treat the question as presenting a tradeoff between paternalistic protection of 
feckless beneficiaries and the protection of voluntary and, more clearly, involun-
tary creditors.257  Thus, the usual focus is on the policy soundness of limiting the 
                                                 
250 English, supra note __, at 208-11. 
251 This is consistent with the move away from cabining trustees’ authority through limited powers and 
towards the fiduciary principle as the trust’s chief governance device. See Langbein, supra note __, at 
641-42; text accompanying supra notes __. 
252 See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 152-53; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58; UTC § 
502.  State law restrictions on transfer are applicable even in bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).  A few 
privileged creditors, however, including children, spouses, and former spouses seeking support or main-
tenance, may sometimes reach the beneficiaries’ interest despite a spendthrift clause. See Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 59; UTC § 503; Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and Starve a Child: The Effective-
ness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for Support and Alimony, 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 691, 
699-723 (1994). 
253 Cf. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 647. 
254 See, e.g., Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An 
Examination of the Compromise , 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 771 (2002); Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law 
of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 Hastings L. J. 287 (2002); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and 
Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); Anne S. Emanuel, 
Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise , 72 Neb. L. Rev. 179 (1993); Erwin N. Griswold, 
Spendthrift Trusts (1936); John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property (1883).  See 
also Fellows, supra  note __. 
255 N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 7-1.5. Spendthrift clauses are standard in practitioner formbooks 
and they are customary estate planning boilerplate.  See Hirsch, supra note __, at 3 & n. 7.   
256 The classic English case is Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811).  For further discussion 
and references, see Moffat, supra note __, at 211-24. 
257 See, e.g., Posner, supra note __, at § 18.7, p. 523-24; Hirsch, supra note __; Emanuel, supra note __; 
Ogus, supra  note __, at 217-18. 
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scope of the beneficiaries’ external relations authority in view of how doing so 
impacts both the beneficiaries and the outsiders with whom the beneficiaries 
transact.  This approach, however, overlooks the  interrelationship between the 
external relations of the trust insiders with third parties on the one hand and 
the details of the internal governance regime on the other.258   
One governance benefit of the enforcement of spendthrift provisions is 
that the payouts in a spendthrift trust may safely be made mandatory.  This re-
duces the trustee’s discretion and so diminishes the potential for managerial 
agency costs.  But the cost is that an alternative potential check on agency costs, 
the theoretical possibility of the residual claimants’ exit, is foreclosed as a mat-
ter of law.  Exit is in theory a powerful governance device, but its potential has 
not been realized in the context of donative trusts.259  The idea is that the conse-
quent market for residual interests would provide price signals on the quality of 
the particular trust’s management. Unlike the initial gratuitous transfer by the 
settlor, a subsequent sale by the beneficiary of his or her interest would indeed 
involve reckoning a price.260   
Moreover, open as compared to closed residual claims offer the possibility 
of welfare-improving secondary transactions.  For example, if in the hands of the 
beneficiary the discounted present value of the future income stream from the 
trust is worth $10, but in the hands of someone who is more adept at monitoring 
and at fiduciary litigation the present value of the beneficiary’s interest would 
be $15, a spendthrift provision results in a $5 residual loss.  This is the agency 
costs “price,” as it were, of honoring the settlor’s dead hand interest in protect-
ing a hapless beneficiary.261 
In the absence of spendthrift recognition, however, settlors who wish to 
guard the trust’s assets against an insolvent beneficiary’s creditors would be 
channeled, as they are in England,262 towards discretionary trusts.263  (Discre-
                                                 
258 There is no reason to limit “third persons” in trust law parlance to those who deal with the trustee as 
trustee.  See, e.g., English, supra  note __, at 208.  Third persons also deal with beneficiaries as benefic i-
aries.  Cf. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 451-53. 
259 Exit is discussed here as a theoretical governance device, because as noted earlier, see text accompa-
nying supra  note 159, there is no well-developed market for American trust interests.  Perhaps this is a 
consequence of the frequency of spendthrift clauses, discretionary trusts, and protective provisions.  
Indeed the availability of the latter two, on which see supra note 263 and text accompanying, also helps 
explain the narrowness of the corresponding English market.  The author thanks Richard Nolan for 
discussion on this point. 
260 See Jensen & Fama, supra note __, at 312-15; Fama, supra note __, at 292; Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note __, at 274-77.  Cf. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Birthrights Up for Auction as Investments in Lon-
don, N.Y. Times D1 (March 6, 1978).  See also notes 113-116 and text accompanying. 
261 The settlor, in other words, must have figured that the beneficiary would alienate his or her interest 
for less than $10 if given the chance to do so.  As Richard Posner has remarked, such “[t]rusts are based 
on mistrust.”  Posner, supra note __, at § 18.7, pp. 523-24. 
262 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 452 n. 57; Halbach, supra note __, at 1893. 
263 See, e.g., UTC § 504; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 155; Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, Discretion-
ary Support Trusts, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1983); Newman, supra note __, at 803-16. Yet another alterna-
tive, also common in England, see, e.g., Hayton, supra note __, at 590-92, is a trust with a “protective 
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tionary trusts are common in American practice too, but American settlors who 
are concerned about a beneficiary’s future insolvency have the spendthrift alter-
native.)  By leaving the payment decision to the discretion of the trustee, the 
beneficiary has no right to a payout, which means that neither does his or her 
creditors.264  But the cost of this alternative disabling restraint is that the fidu-
ciary obligation is further burdened with the task of regulating the trustees’ ex-
ercise of this discretion over disbursements. 265   Since the remedy for an 
underpayment is merely an order that the payments be increased,266 but the 
remedy for an overpayment is to surcharge the trustee personally for the excess 
amounts disbursed,267 this skews trustees towards caution.268  What is more, in-
terests in discretionary trusts are not easily saleable because there is no guar-
antee of future payments, so discretionary trusts, like spendthrifts, fail to allow 
for exit. 
These differing routes to giving effect to the settlor’s interest in cabining 
the right of a beneficiary to alienate his or her interest in the trust—a manda-
tory trust with a spendthrift limitation versus a discretionary trust—have dif-
ferent agency costs consequences.  Thus it is not obvious that disapproval of the 
spendthrift trust either decreases agency costs or improves the lot of the benefi-
ciaries’ creditors (though of course creditors of discretionary trust beneficiaries 
have leverage that creditors of spendthrift trust beneficiaries lack).  Perhaps the 
divergence of opinion among the common law jurisdictions reflects this difficulty 
in reckoning the magnitudes of the foregoing competing e ffects.   
Even if it does not help resolve the policy question of which form of pro-
tective measure is preferable, agency costs analysis does help explain the con-
tinued existence of one or more of them in all the common law jurisdictions.  
Without the option of at least one enforceable protective measure, settlors who 
are concerned about a beneficiary’s future insolvency would be channeled to-
wards informal arrangements such as outright transfers to trusted kin or 
                                                                                                                                          
provision.”  This is a clause that conditions the beneficiaries’ interest on his or her solvency or the non-
occurrence of any event that, but for the protective provision, the beneficiary’s interest would be reach-
able by a third party.  See id.; Emanuel, supra note __, at 185-86; Ogus, supra note __, at 205; Bogert, 
supra note __, at § 44; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 57; Trustee Act 1925 § 33 (UK). 
264  See, e.g., UTC § 504(b); Goforth v. Gee, 975 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Ky. 1998); United States v. 
O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1994); Hamilton v. Drogo, 150 N.E. 496 (N.Y. 1926); Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 155 & cmt. b; IIA Scott on Trusts § 155.1, pp. 159-64.  But see Halbach, supra  
note __, at 1895; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 60 cmt. e. 
265 See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 
1425 (1961); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50. 
266 See Halbach, supra  note __, at 1427; William M. McGovern, Jr. & Sheldon F. Kurtz, Wills, Trusts, 
and Estates § 9.5, p. 339-40 (2001); Estate of Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Mont. 1994); Kolodney v. 
Kolodney, 503 A.2d 625 (Conn. App. 1986). 
267 See Halbach, supra note __, at 1427; McGovern & Kurtz, supra note __, at § 9.5, p. 339-40; Austin v. 
U.S. Bank of Washington, 869 P.2d 404 (Wash. App. 1994); Feibelman v. Worthen Nat. Bank, 20 F.3d 
835 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Murray, 45 A.2d 636 (Me. 1946).   
268 A further though illegitimate reason for trustee conservatism is that their fees are often a percentage 
of the trust corpus, though this rules-based approach is now giving way to a “reasonableness” standard.  
See supra note __. 
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friends with a wink and nod that the transferee will take care of the would-be 
beneficiary.269  The potential agency costs to the beneficiaries and to the settlor 
of this approach, which would hardly benefit the beneficiaries’ creditors, are 
manifest. 
D. Fiduciary Litigation  
As we have seen, the possibility of market-based governance devices for 
the private trust is cabined by the impediments, central to the donative trust’s 
often paternalistic function, to the beneficiaries’ alienating their stake in the 
trust and the difficulty in sacking the trustee.  So in today’s managerial private 
trusts, in which the limits of yore on the trustee’s authority have yielded to 
broad grants of discretion, this places much of the governance burden on the fi-
duciary obligation.270  It is here, however, that the agency costs approach to the 
private trust most closely converges with Langbein’s contractarianism: both 
point strongly towards a contractarian, hypothetical-bargain underpinning for 
the fiduciary obligation.271  Indeed, drawing on earlier economic analyses of the 
fiduciary relationship more generally,272 Langbein persuasively shows that “pul-
pit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations” notwithstand-
ing,273 the fiduciary duties imposed by the law of trusts are simply majoritarian 
default rules.274   
                                                 
269 For further discussion and references, see Hirsch, supra note __, at 70-71. 
270 See Langbein, supra note __, at 642 (discussing the decline of powers law and the rise of fiduc iary 
law for protecting the interests of the beneficiaries). 
271 There is no shortage of commentary on fiduciary duties generally.  See, e.g., Alexander, supra  note 
__; William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law’s Duty of Loyalty,  
in Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., Progressive Corporate Law  (1995); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:  A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev 1 (1990); 
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties 55, in John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
eds., Principles and Agents:  The Structure of Business  55 (1985); Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics 
and Morality:  Contracting Out of Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties, 19 Canadian Bus. L. J. 28 (1991); 
Cooter & Freedman, supra  note __; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 Duke L. J. 879; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary 
Duty, 36 J. L. & Econ. 425 (1993); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 Oregon L. Rev. 
(1995); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law , 71 Cal. L. Rev 795 (1983); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of 
Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. Toronto L. J. 199 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, The Structure of the Fiduciary Rela-
tionship (manuscript); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 Cambridge L. J. 69; J.C. Shepherd, 
Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L. Q. Rev. 51 (1981); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1399 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fidu-
ciary Obligation, 28 U. Toronto L. J. 1 (1975). 
272 A point anticipated in Alexander, supra note __, at 1.  See Langbein, supra  note __, at 657-60, citing 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __; Cooter & Freedman, supra note __.  See also Fischel & Langbein, 
supra note __, at 1113-17.   
273 Which is not to say that moral condemnation does not have utility as an expressive sanction, espe-
cially for institutional fiduciaries for whom reputation is a valuable asset.  See Cooter & Freedman, 
supra note __, at 1073-74; Langbein, supra note __, at 658.  
274 “Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody the default regime that the parties 
to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for regulating the trustee’s behavior in these settings in 
which it is impractical to foresee precise circumstances and to specify more exact terms.”  Langbein, 
supra note __, at 629, 657-60.   
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Thus, this section will not engage the debate over the contractarian basis 
for trust fiduciary law.  Nor will it explore the tightness of fit between the struc-
ture of the fiduciary obligation in trust law and the agency problems embedded 
in the private trust (though there was some discussion of this earlier).275  In-
stead, this section will briefly explore two possible answers to the question of 
why the fiduciary obligation appears to have succeeded as the private trust’s 
chief check on agency costs.276  The question is brought into sharp relief by the 
widely-held view that the fiduciary obligation has proved to be a less successful 
governance device in the cognate field of corporate governance.277  
1. Litigation incentives.  When liability rules are the chief check on 
agency costs, there is a practical limit to the number of residual claimants that 
the organization can reasonably support.  The greater the number, the more se-
rious the collective action dynamic that will weaken any individual’s inventive 
to monitor and then to bring litigation.278  Consider, for example, that the para-
digmatic shareholder in a publicly-traded corporation has only a trivial stake in 
the company.  So he or she has little incentive to reckon the costs and benefits of 
litigation from the perspective of all the shareholders.  Consequently in corpo-
rate fiduciary litigation the real party in interest is often the lawyer.279   
Litigation incentives are likely to be different, however, in the world of 
private donative trusts thanks to the (typically) smaller number of residual 
claimants.280  Donative trust beneficiaries are likely to have a nontrivial stake 
when stake is measured by either the fraction of his or her wealth held in the 
trust or the fractional share of the trust to which he or she is entitled.  Accord-
ingly, fiduciary litigation in trust law is more likely than in corporate law to be 
prompted by the merits.  That is, the relatively smaller number of residual 
                                                 
275 See supra Parts IV.A.1 (duty of impartiality) and IV.A.3 (duty of care).  See also Sitkoff, supra note 
__, at __ (duty of loyalty, duty of disclosure).  For general discussion, see Cooter & Freedman, supra note 
__, at 1047; W. Bishop & D.D. Prentice, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Fiduciary Remuneration, 
46 Mod. L. Rev. 289 (1983); Fischel & Langbein, supra note __, at 1113-17.  
276 For a behavioral decision theory approach to this question, see Alexander, supra note __. 
277 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litig ation Without Foundation?,  7 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 
55 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park, & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Share-
holder Interests?, 82 Geo. L. J. 1733 (1994); Bradley & Fischel, supra note __; John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. & Contemp. Prob. 5 
(1985); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit:  An Evaluation 
and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261 (1981); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 8.3, 
pp. 365-68.  See also Sitkoff, supra note __ (comparing the governance of public corporations with that of 
donative trusts).  
278 See Gordon, supra note __, at 76-79. 
279 See Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 8.3, p. 367; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra  note __, at 100-02; Allen 
& Kraakman, supra note __, at § 10.2, pp. 351-52, 355-56.  See generally John C. Coffee, Understanding 
the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The 
Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recom-
mendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991). 
280 This point was noted in Macey, supra note __, at 319-20.  See also Hirsch & Wang, supra note __, at 
29 n. 110. 
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claimants and their relatively larger stakes lessens the impact of the collective 
action and free-rider dynamics. 
This is not to say that the litigation incentives for trust beneficiaries are 
perfect.  Some beneficiaries lack a sufficient stake to reckon the costs and bene-
fits of bringing litigation.281  What is more, awards of attorneys’ fees to one or 
both sides in suits over trust administration are not uncommon.282  Even though 
courts can use this as a tool to encourage meritorious litigation, the availability 
of attorneys fees can also encourage strike suits.283  Still, the more modest claim 
holds—fiduciary litigation is a viable governance option in trust law because 
there are fewer residual claimants and the collective action pathology is thereby 
minimized. 
A separate objection might be that beneficiaries are often unsuited to 
monitor the trustee, perhaps because they are unborn, incapacitated, or simply 
irresponsible.  After all, tax exigencies to one side, the settlor didn’t trust them 
enough to make an outright transfer, favoring instead a trust despite its inher-
ent agency costs.  But trust fiduciary law, especially the duty of loyalty, is 
stricter and more prophylactic than the fiduciary law of other organizational 
forms.284  Hence, as Fischel and Langbein have suggested, many of trust law’s 
fiduciary duties can be understood as “substitutes for monitoring by the directly 
interested parties.”285  Moreover, the modern trend is towards expanding further 
the duty of trustees to furnish beneficiaries with relevant information regarding 
the management of the trust.286 
At any rate, this analysis throws light on the relevance of the number of 
residual claimants to the choice of organizational form.287  The agency costs-
checking mechanisms of the private trust depends on their being relatively 
fewer.  The corporation, in contrast, is constructed so that it can—but need not, 
as shown by the success of the close corporation—handle many.  Unlike the typi-
cal close corporation, the trust separates risk bearing and management; but 
                                                 
281 See Gordon, supra note __, at 76-79.   
282 See, e.g., UTC § 1004 (court may award fees); III Scott on Trusts § 188.4 (trustees’ authority to pay 
fees out of the trust corpus); Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 111-12 (Wash. 1983); 
Gordon, supra note __, at 76-77 n. 103. 
283 See generally Allen & Kraakman, supra note __, at § 10.2, pp. 351-52; Posner, supra note __, at § 
21.11. 
284 Consider, for example, the no-further-inquiry rule, on which see sources cited in infra note __.  See 
also supra Part IV.A.3 (comparison of the duty of care in trust law and corporate law). 
285 Fischel & Langbein, supra note __, at 1114-15, 1118-19.  Note the emergence of organizations such as 
Heirs, Inc., the purpose of which is to facilitate better monitoring by trust beneficiaries.  See 
<http://www.heirs.net/>.  See also Kathy Kristof, An Heir of Confidence, Chicago Trib. C7 (May 21, 
1996). 
286 See Halbach, supra note __, at 1914-15; UTC § 813.  See also Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 663 
P.2d 104, 110-111 (Wash. 1983); Langbein, supra note __, at 74; Langbein, manuscript, supra note __, at 
Part II.C.  For further discussion of disclosure in trust law, see Sitkoff, supra note __. 
287 See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note __. 
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unlike the public corporation, the trust’s residual claim is typically split among 
a small number of claimants.288    
The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agency-costs-
checking utility of the fiduciary obligation is further emphasized by a quick 
comparison of the private trust with the statutory business trust.  The chief dif-
ferences between the two are in the frequency with which business trusts pro-
vide voting rights, transferable or at least redeemable interests, and less rigor-
ous processes for removing trustees.289  Together, these characteristics make the 
business trust look more like a public corporation than a donative private trust.  
Likewise the governance of numerous commercial manifestations of the private 
trust, at least when the residual claims are sold to outsiders, also more closely 
resembles the governance of the public corporation than it does the donative 
private trust.290  It will therefore be interesting to see whether the ongoing re-
laxation of the rule against perpetuities and its consequent increase in the 
number of beneficiaries in donative trusts will eventually push trust law to-
wards more of a corporate governance model. 
It seems likely, moreover, that this agency costs analysis could be applied 
to employee benefit and pension trusts, upon which ERISA imposes a manda-
tory trust law paradigm.291  Indeed, on first glance it appears that, given the 
large number of participants in many of these plans, the incentive structure and 
agency costs analysis for pension and employee benefits trusts might be more 
like that of public corporations than the traditional gratuitous private trust.  
This may explain some of the tension between the trust law paradigm and the 
realities of pension and employee benefit trusts in practice.292   
The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agency costs 
calculus is still further supported by the widely-held view that  the absence of 
                                                 
288 In a loose sense, then, the trust is closer to the Alchian and Demsetz conception of the firm, with the 
residual claimant as the chief monitor, Alchian & Demsetz, supra note __, at 782, than it is to the later 
agency cost models of the public corporation, see, e.g., Fama, supra note __, at 289.  But the trust is not 
as close to Alchian and Demsetz’s model as the close corporation, for which the managers tend also to be 
the chief residual claimants. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 273. 
289 See generally Schwarcz, supra  note __; Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as 
the New Corporate Law, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 325 (2001); Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware 
Business Trusts, in R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkels tein, The Delaware Law of Corporations & 
Business Organizations (2003); Andrew B. Kopans, The Business Trust in the Mutual Fund Industry:  
Old Arguments in a New Industry with Two New Players (unpublished manuscript); Sheldon A. Jones, 
Laura M. Moret, & James M. Storey, The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment 
Companies,  13 Del. J. Corp. L. 421 (1988).  See also Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924); Note, 
Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1048 (1929). 
290 See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 579.  See also Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contrac-
tual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of Structure and Governance, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 927 (1994); Lang-
bein, supra note __. 
291 ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103; Langbein & Polk, supra note __, at 646-48.  
292 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note __, at 1107 (arguing that “the central concept of ERISA fiduciary 
law, the exclusive benefit rule, misdescribes the reality of the modern pension and employee benefit 
trust”).  See also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 207. 
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identifiable beneficiaries in charitable trusts raises serious governance prob-
lems.293   
2. Fiduciary sub-rules.  In other contexts, perhaps the most apposite be-
ing the governance of closely-held corporations, it has been suggested that the 
“usefulness of fiduciary duties as a guide for conduct is limited” by their being so 
open ended.294  But the private trust differs importantly from the close corpora-
tion in that there is less variance in the operating context from one trust to an-
other.  This relative homogeneity of context has allowed the law of trusts to 
evolve a detailed schedule of fiduciary sub-rules as specific agency costs-
checking devices where law of close corporations depends instead on the parties’ 
cutting their own circumstances-specific deal.295  The fiduciary sub-rules of trust 
law include the duties to keep and control trust property, to enforce claims, to 
defend actions, to keep trust property separate, to minimize costs (including 
taxes), to furnish information to the beneficiaries, and so on.296   
The function of these sub-rules is to provide the benefits of rules (as com-
pared to standards) without inviting strategic loop-holing by trustees.297  When 
aggrieved beneficiaries can squeeze their claim into a specific sub-rule—and for 
these purposes, the default ban on self-dealing known as the no -further-inquiry 
rule can be included within this analysis298—their case is simplified.  As in the 
application of any rule, the costs of decision are lower than for a standard.  But 
when the aggrieved beneficiaries cannot squeeze their claim into a specific sub-
rule, then the broad standards of care and loyalty serve as a backstop to allow 
for contextual, facts-and-circumstances inquiry into the trustees’ behavior as a 
part of the courts’ gap filling role owing to “the impossibility of writing contracts 
completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”299  Recall that in the modern 
managerial trust, the fiduciary obligation has eclipsed detailed schedules of lim-
ited powers as the chief device for controlling managerial agency costs.300  The 
effectiveness of the trust law fiduciary obligation as a check on agency costs is 
thus enhanced by use of a mix of sub-rules and overarching standards,301 the 
                                                 
293 See sources cited in supra notes 179, 233.  See also Macey, supra note __, at 315. 
294 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 291. 
295 See id. at 281-86. 
296 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 172-185; UTC §§ 801-13. 
297 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 557 (1992); 
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 
(1974).  See also Mindgames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-58 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.); 
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law , 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988). 
298 On the no-further-inquiry rule, see, e.g., Hartman v. Hartle , 122 A. 615 (N.J. 1923); IIA Scott on 
Trusts §170.2, p. 320.  For commentary, see Sitkoff, supra note __, at __; Cooter & Ulen, supra note __, 
at 1054; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 437. 
299 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 426.   
300 See supra note __ and text accompanying.  Note the parallel to the fall of the ultra vires doctrine in 
corporate law.  See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __. 
301 A similar sub-rule phenomenon exists within the law of agency, see Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§§ 380-86, 388-98.  The detailed rules of legal ethics, see, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Responsibility 
1.1 – 1.16; Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rules 5-101 – 5-107, might also be under-
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This paper’s agency costs approach to the donative private trust not only 
helps illuminate the ongoing debate over whether trust law is closer to property 
law or contract law, but more importantly it provides a rich positive and norma-
tive framework for further economic analysis of trust law.  Principal-agent eco-
nomics, in other words, has great potential to offer further insights about the 
nature and function of the law of trusts.  In particular, the agency costs analysis 
of this paper demonstrates how and why the use of the private trust triggers a 
temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor’s 
original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem when risk-bearing and 
management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will act in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants).   
 
The paper’s normative claim was that the law of private trusts should 
minimize the agency costs inherent to locating managerial autho rity with the 
trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that 
doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor.  This qualifica-
tion gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary 
principal.  The positive claim was that, at least with respect to traditional doc-
trines, the law of trusts conforms to the suggested normative approach.  In par-
ticular, the paper demonstrated the power of the agency costs approach to offer 
fresh insights by looking at recurring problem areas in trust law including, 
among others, trust modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary 
litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, 
the role of so-called trust “protectors,” and spendthrift trusts.   
                                                                                                                                          
stood as manifestation of this sub-rule phenomenon.  Cf. James R. McCall, Endangering Individual 
Autonomy in Choice of Lawyers and Trustees—Misconceived Conflict of Interest Claims in the Kame-
hameha Schools Bishop Estate Litigation, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 487, 488 n. 1 (1999). 
302 On the relevance of ex ante programmability to agency costs analysis, see Eisenhardt, supra  note __, 
at 62. 
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